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Abstract 
Changing aid modality has affected various stakeholders in development policy-making and 
implementation especially at the national level where donors, the government and other 
institutions engage. There are many processes, engagements and, subsequently, aid-
influenced policies. The way these international and national processes translate into local 
policy implementation is unclear and has for many years led to plans that cannot be 
implemented. 
This study was conducted in Tanzania and involved stakeholders at the national level and in 
two districts: Arusha and Kongwa.  The field work involved interviews with 33 individuals 
working on aid, policy-making, advocacy and service delivery in primary education.  A 
qualitative approach of inquiry was employed using mainly key informant interviews and 
observation. Documentary evidence supplemented information gaps in the process.   
Key findings of this study are grouped into two major categories: actors and processes. The 
changing aid modality from project support to budget support has affected actors 
differently. The new aid modality has empowered the central government in leadership of 
development policy-making processes. However other important actors such as civil society 
organisations and the local government have been weakened in the process. Following the 
Paris Declaration principles, promoting government leadership has been successful but 
country ownership, in a broader sense, has not. Strong central government leadership has 
resulted into government ownership instead of wider country ownership. The central 
government does not necessarily take on board policy inputs from other actors which have 
resulted in feelings of tokenism especially on the side of civil society organisations. The local 
government has become dependent on central government in terms of financial and 
institutional resources. The idea of local governance autonomy has not been realised 
because of the strong presence of central government in frameworks, procedures and 
personnel. There is virtually no space opened up for civil society dialogue at district level 
where policy-implementation happens.  
Processes and subsequent outcomes were also affected by the changing aid modality. There 
are still many processes going on at the same time often with the same people. New 
procedures have led to fatigue and decreased quality of dialogue which the new aid 
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modality was established to correct.  The outcomes of these processes have been increased 
government ownership, and improved systems and procedures to deliver aid and to 
implement policies. However unintended effects have been poor implementation of policies, 
for example underfunding of primary education capitation grants due to a lack of coherence 
amongst different government agencies. At the community or school committee level the 
rigid centralised financial guidelines have left little or no room for creativity. Community 
voluntary participation is quickly fading away.  
Changing aid modality has had effects on local policy-making and implementation. The 
central government, donors and to some extent civil society are effectively involved. 
However, it is the central government that has captured policy-making process and 
implementation.  
  
 iv 
 
Acknowledgement 
I am thankful for all the people that have made this work successful. It is not possible to 
mention everyone who made a significant contribution towards completion of this work; 
however I will mention a few.   I specifically want to extend my sincere gratitude to my 
supervisor Prof John Overton for tirelessly giving his constructive and expert support. I 
appreciate his invaluable contribution towards this milestone. 
I deeply express my appreciation to my family, first Emmy my wife and children Abigail, 
Wendo and Faith for being part of me even when things were very difficult. I also thank my 
father Isaya and mother Foibe for continued parental support even at this age! 
Words cannot express my gratitude to all people who gave their time for interviews and 
logistical arrangement in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and Kongwa.  Particularly I want 
to thank Lister Nyang’anyi who facilitated study permits in Dodoma, Michael Mlonga for 
hosting me in Arusha and Joseph Makau for logistical arrangements in Kongwa. 
My deepest gratitude should go to NZAID for funding my studies and making life easier in 
Wellington. I sincerely thank University Hall staff for providing a homely environment in a 
busy institution. 
I also want to recognise friendly environment provided by people we shared an office; 
Simon Bidwell, Matias Mastrangelo, Eugenia Marino, Mary Redmayne, Ruifei Tang, Joseph 
McCarter, Peter Jackson and Chris Moore for a wonderful team spirit which provided an 
environment for success. 
I appreciate the leadership and community of Arise Church in Wellington for being part of a 
great family of God providing spiritual and moral support for me and my family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................................. iv 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................ vii 
List of Pictures ....................................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................................... viii 
Chapter One Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction and Background ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Problem Statement ....................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Purpose of the Study ..................................................................................................................... 4 
1.4 Research questions ....................................................................................................................... 4 
1.5 Objectives...................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.6 Significance of the Study ............................................................................................................... 5 
1.7 Scope of the Study ........................................................................................................................ 5 
1.8 Chapter Outline ............................................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter 2 Literature Review: The influence of Aid on local development strategies ............................ 7 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 7 
2.2 Theoretical Background ................................................................................................................ 7 
2.3 Aid Debates ................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.4 Dominant development theory and institutional impact ........................................................... 11 
2.5 Aid Modalities and changing landscapes of Foreign Aid ............................................................ 18 
2.5.1 Global Aid Structure: The Paris Declaration ........................................................................ 18 
2.5.2 Aid Modality and Institutional Impact ................................................................................. 25 
2.6 Conceptual framework: Aid, the State, Local Government and Civil Society ............................. 26 
2.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 3  The Context of Aid and Local Polity..................................................................................... 29 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 29 
3.2 Aid and Policy-making in Tanzania .............................................................................................. 29 
3.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 37 
Chapter 4 Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 38 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 38 
4.2 Research Epistemology: Constructivist and Participatory Worldviews ...................................... 38 
4.3 Research Design .......................................................................................................................... 39 
 vi 
 
4.3.1 Qualitative methods ............................................................................................................ 39 
4.3.2 Semi-structured and key informant interviews ................................................................... 40 
4.3.3 Documentary review ............................................................................................................ 40 
4.3.4 Primary and Secondary Data Sources .................................................................................. 41 
4.4 Data Collection ............................................................................................................................ 47 
4.5 Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 47 
4.6 Ethical Considerations ................................................................................................................. 48 
4.7 Positionality................................................................................................................................. 48 
4.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 49 
Chapter 5 Changing Aid Modality – the Roles of Different Actors ....................................................... 50 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 50 
5.2 Actors’ Changing Roles ................................................................................................................ 50 
5.4 Impacts on Other Actors ............................................................................................................. 57 
5.4.1 Local Government Authorities ................................................................................................. 57 
5.4.3 Development Partners ......................................................................................................... 66 
5.4.4 Local Communities ............................................................................................................... 68 
5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 72 
Chapter 6 Processes and Outcomes ..................................................................................................... 74 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 74 
6.2 Aid processes and complexity of dialogue at national Level ...................................................... 75 
6.3 Rhetoric is not equal to reality: the problem lies with policy implementation .......................... 82 
6.4 Changing expectations in Tanzania in relation to aid effectiveness ........................................... 84 
6.5 Effects of Decentralization by Devolution .................................................................................. 93 
6.6 Transparency and accountability ................................................................................................ 98 
6.7 Declining participation in community contributions ................................................................ 101 
6.8 Effectiveness of aid modality .................................................................................................... 103 
6.9 Local government decision-making critical issues .................................................................... 105 
6.10 Exit strategy? ........................................................................................................................... 105 
6.11 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 106 
Chapter 7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 107 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 112 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................................... 117 
Appendix 1 Research Permits ......................................................................................................... 117 
Appendix 1.1 Permit Letters from Regional Administrative Secretaries Arusha and Dodoma .. 117 
 vii 
 
Appendix 1.2 Permit Letters from District Administrative Secretaries Arusha and Kongwa ..... 119 
Appendix 2 Ethics Approval ............................................................................................................ 121 
Appendix 3 Interview Schedule ...................................................................................................... 122 
Appendix 4 Quiet Period Letter ...................................................................................................... 124 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Aid Modality and institutional impact ................................................................................... 26 
Table 4.1 Study Participants ................................................................................................................. 46 
Table 5.1 Aid Composition as Percentage of Total Overseas Aid Recorded in the National Budget ... 53 
Table 6.1 Planned contributions of GBS for fiscal year 2008/09 .......................................................... 90 
Table 6.2 LGAs sources of revenue ....................................................................................................... 92 
Table 6.3 Capitation grants use ............................................................................................................ 96 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Characteristics of the major instruments for development ................................................ 24 
Figure 3.1 Government preferred aid modality .................................................................................... 34 
Figure 5.1 Actors, Roles and Aid flows in Project Support (1980s-1990s) ............................................ 51 
Figure 5.2 Actors, Roles, and Aid flows in General Budget Support (2000s-2010) ............................... 55 
Figure 6.1 Current dialogue structure................................................................................................... 78 
Figure 6.2 Proposed new dialogue structure ........................................................................................ 82 
 
 
List of Pictures 
Photo 6.1 Village Notice Board to enhance accountability and transparency ..................................... 99 
Photo 6.2 Public Letter from District Executive Director showing April 2010 grants ......................... 100 
 
 
  
 viii 
 
List of Acronyms 
BCs                                     Beneficiary Communities 
CSOs                                   Civil Society Organisations 
CWG                                   Cluster Working Group 
DAC                                     Development Assistance Committee 
DCF                                     Development Cooperation Forum 
DDs                                     District Departments 
DPG                                    Development Partners Group 
DPs                                     Development Partners 
ECF                                      Extended Credit Facility 
ERP                                     Economic Recovery Programs  
GBS                                    General Budget Support 
HIPC                                   Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
IFIs                                     International Finance Institutions 
INGOs                               International Non Governmental Organisations 
JAST                                   Joint Assistance Strategy in Tanzania 
JCG                                     Joint Coordinating Group 
KII                                       Key Informant Interview 
LGA                                    Local Government Authority 
LGDG                                 Local Government Development Grant  
LGRP                                  Local Government Reform Program 
MCC                                  Millennium Challenge Corporation 
MDA                                 Ministry, Departments, Agencies 
MDGs                               Millennium Development Goals 
MKUKUTA                       Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania 
MOEVT                            Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 
 ix 
 
MoFEA                        Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
MTEF                           Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
NGO                             Non Governmental Organisation 
NNGOs                        National Non Governmental Organisations 
NPES                            National Poverty Eradication Strategy 
NSGRP                        National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
ODA                            Official Development Assistance 
OECD                          Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PAF                             Performance Assessment Framework 
PEDP                           Primary Education Development Plan 
PER                             Public Expenditure Review 
PETS                           Public Expenditure Tracking Study 
PMORALG                 Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government 
PRBS                           Poverty Reduction Budget Support 
PRGF                           Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
PRGT                           Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
PRSPs                          Poverty Reduction Papers 
SAPs                            Structural Adjustment Policies 
SBS                              Sector Budget Support 
SWAps                        Sector Wide Approaches  
TAS                              Tanzania Assistance Strategy 
TCDD                           Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development  
TEN/MET                    Tanzania Education Network/Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania 
TWG                            Technical Working Group 
URT                              United Republic of Tanzania 
WDC                            Ward Development Committee
 
 
Chapter One Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction and Background  
Recently, as global development agencies have sought to maximise aid effectiveness and 
reduce costs involved in aid delivery, aid modality has changed from primarily supporting 
projects to a mix of budget support and sector wide approaches (SWAPs). These changes 
have called for greater engagement of particularly the government, as well as donors and, 
later, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector. However, the institutional 
impact of this new aid modality on the district level actors such as local government and 
district civil society organisations has been less evident. 
Major global changes in aid modality occurred from the late 1990s and early 2000s. These 
changes occurred as the result of demands from donors for accountability and increased 
effectiveness of aid and the need for recipient governments to own development initiatives.  
Projects were, and still are, regarded as the most manageable form of aid by donors. 
However, recipient governments tended not to prefer projects because most projects by-
passed governments’ finance systems or resulted in duplication of donor-funded activities in 
one area or sector. Also, projects took more government and donor staff time. These 
challenges led to calls for effective aid delivery using recipient governments’ budget 
framework, and, hence budget support. But before budget support became operational, 
donors wanted to monitor resources and outcomes using other funding modalities in which 
they could earmark funding in the short term. These included basket funding and sector 
wide approaches which enable more than one donor agency to pool resources for a 
particular sector such as education in response to the government’s national development 
strategy. Recipient governments were expected to deliver services from the main budget 
which included aid plus their own local resources. The changed aid modality involved policy 
negotiations and discussions at the national level between donors, government agencies, 
and non state actors which was to include civil society organisations and the private sector. 
This new aid modality went hand-in-hand with other major global initiatives in development, 
namely the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000.  These 
global initiatives focused on managing development and poverty reduction with emphasis 
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on pro-poor sectors such as education.  Donors and invited recipients started to convene 
international agreements. The first largest meeting to improve management and 
effectiveness of aid was the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002. 
The High Level Meeting in Rome (2003) involved multilateral banks and bilateral agencies, 
and donor and recipient countries representatives.  The Rome commitments were to 
minimise transaction costs and improve aid effectiveness. However, the turning point on aid 
effectiveness was reached at the Paris Declaration in 2005. In Paris, the global agreements 
stipulated country ownership, harmonisation, alignment, managing for results, and mutual 
accountability.  In this high level meeting, both development partners and developing 
nations’ representatives agreed on indicators that were to be used to measure progress.   
The Paris Declaration built a strong foundation for countries to achieve the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals. The Paris Declaration structured the aid industry into a 
system with instruments that would be used in unison by donors and recipients. Henceforth, 
aid was structured and managed globally.   
Significantly, development policy-making and implementation in the new aid modality 
shifted emphasis to the state level. The national government was again entrusted to lead 
the local development agenda. Aid adopted a global structure which reinstated the power 
of the state and its leadership in recipient countries. The state was trusted to deliver aid 
resources to its impoverished citizens. 
Non state actors, however, were mentioned very little in Rome and Paris. The global aid 
structure allowed little or no space for civil society and the private sector. However, in the 
follow up meeting that produced the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, civil society and the 
private sector were given greater prominence.   The meaning of partnership was broadened 
in Accra to include civil society and the private sector in both donor and recipient countries. 
The role of civil society was to ensure that transparent policies were adopted by the 
government to effectively deliver aid and safeguard human rights.  
Increasingly, the new aid modalities have built capacity of the state at the expense of the 
local or district level. The imbalance from tilting the power to the central government has in 
a way disempowered the local government despite the rhetoric of decentralisation. Aid 
dialogue is strong between donors, recipient states, and, to some extent, civil society at the 
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national level. The inclusion of civil society organisations and the private sector has actually 
opened up policy engagement space for alternative voices. These voices are not necessarily 
the people’s voices, but alternatives that challenge the state and the development partners.  
Tanzania is still aid dependent and receives general budget support from 14 different 
bilateral and multilateral donors. However, the majority of foreign assistance from nearly 30 
donors goes through projects run by ministries, departments, and agencies. These projects 
deliver a significant amount of aid that goes through non-governmental organisations and 
local governments. The major institutional impact of aid, however, is made through budget 
support and through the agency of the Treasury. Local government, therefore, is not directly 
involved in the aid dialogue. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In policy-making in the aid and development environment, great emphasis has been given 
to national level consultations and ownership. Examination of the major agreements such as 
the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, 
shows that national governments and national level stakeholders – such as civil society and 
the private sector – are ideally given mandate to collectively own development policies 
under government leadership. Policy-making and implementation space has opened up 
engagements between state and non state actors. However, international agreements 
between donors and recipients have assumed fair participation of development actors in 
policy-making and implementation at the national level. There is a general assumption that 
the global aid structure works well at the national level. These national level policy 
engagements are supposed to be emulated at the district level. Local government agencies, 
district civil society organisations, and the private sector are expected to actively participate 
in policy discussions and implementation activities. 
What is not clear though is the extent to which aid-influenced decision-making processes at 
both national and district levels include all development actors as described by the Paris 
Declaration.  There is scanty evidence whether the new aid modality has, in fact, facilitated 
inclusive policy-engagement space at the national level. Further to this, limited research has 
been undertaken to uncover district level policy discussions. The extent to which district 
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authorities, communities, and non state actors have responded to this changing aid 
modality is the focus of this study. 
 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to establish the influence, agency, and consequences of 
foreign aid on local development sectors, focussing on primary education. Firstly, this 
involves the way foreign assistance influences, directly or indirectly, decision-making and 
implementation at country and district levels. Secondly, this study aims to find how key 
players in national and local government policy-making respond to guidelines in changing 
aid modality.  This includes examining the principles of the Paris Declaration in practice at 
the local level.  Thirdly, this study explores consequences that result from the influence of 
foreign aid on policy-making and implementation processes.  The changing aid modality 
from projects to budget support and sector wide approaches has started different processes 
between various actors, both local and international. These processes and subsequent 
outcomes are the subject of this research. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
This study addresses the main research question “To what extent has changing aid modality 
influenced local decision-making at national and district levels in primary education?” 
 
Furthermore, the research aims to answer the following three questions 
1. How do aid instruments influence decisions in the implementation of district 
development priorities? 
2. To what extent do district-level decision-making processes in priority sectors include 
local development plans and priorities? 
3. What is the response of different district-level development stakeholders in planning 
and implementing aid-assisted development priorities? 
 
1.5 Objectives 
The study had three key objectives. 
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 To determine the extent to which changed aid modality has shaped district-level 
priorities and implementation 
 To establish the role of actors in the decision-making processes and implementation 
of initiatives 
 To explore the responses of different players at the district council to development 
priorities.  
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The influence of foreign aid in local development initiatives is significant. The mandate to 
plan and execute development determines the expected progress and ownership. This study 
is crucial given the role entrusted to local authorities in formulating and implementing 
development initiatives. Furthermore, the extent to which aid effectiveness principles work 
in practice at local level needs to be better understood.  Also, what is debated, planned, and 
implemented at the district-level sometimes includes local innovations and ignores global 
and national aid policies, but this is rarely documented in mainstream development 
discourse. 
 
1.7 Scope of the Study   
The new aid modality seems to be giving recipients more ownership, leadership, and 
responsibility. Yet, little is said of the impact of changing aid modality on local decision-
making and implementation especially at the district and community level.   Aid involves 
many sectors (health, infrastructure, agriculture etc) but it is not possible to look at all these 
sectors in detail. The scope of this study was confined to the primary education sector 
policy-making and implementation processes and actors involved. Further to this, this study 
focused on selected districts in Tanzania. This is used as an illustrative case study to gain an 
understanding of the broader elements of global-national-local relationships in aid. 
 
1.8 Chapter Outline 
This thesis has seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject of foreign assistance 
and local development policy-making and implementation. Also, this chapter presents the 
research objectives and questions. 
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Chapter two presents literature reviewed including a theoretical backdrop of foreign aid in 
development and policy-making. Key arguments and debates on foreign assistance are 
presented. The literature is further explored for institutional impacts of changing aid 
modality including global aid agenda at the local level and Tanzanian experience.  
Chapter three is a presentation of a research context in Tanzania as it is linked to research 
findings. This chapter establishes the context of changing aid modality and its influence in 
institutions, processes, and outcomes with regards to global-national-district connections.  
Chapter four describes the research methodology and its consequent methods. Chapters 
five and six present field research findings and discussion.  This includes the analysis of 
interviews, and implications for the roles of various actors in education sector development 
policy-making processes and outcomes.  Finally, chapter seven presents conclusions of the 
main findings of this thesis.   
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Chapter 2 Literature Review: The influence of Aid on local development strategies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review aims to uncover the extent to which changed aid modalities have 
influenced local development initiatives from community, district, and national level 
perspectives.  First, this chapter covers the theoretical background of foreign aid. Second, 
major aid debates are explored with reference to their focus on poverty alleviation and the 
Millennium Development Goals. Third, aid modalities and the changing landscape of aid are 
assessed in the perspective of dominant development theories across time. Fourth, a 
conceptual framework is suggested for the capacity of the state as viewed from the 
perspective of other actors such as local government and civil society in the context of the 
new aid modality. Finally, this chapter concludes by identifying a possible research gap that 
exists in the way changing aid modality is influencing local relationships.   
 
 2.2 Theoretical Background 
Foreign aid or development assistance is defined by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the OECD as financial flows that qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
ODA is defined as “the sum of grants and loans to developing countries and territories which 
are: (a) undertaken by the official sector of the donor country; (b) with promotion of 
economic development and welfare in recipient countries as the main objective; (c) at 
concessional financial terms that (in the case of a loan) have a grant element of at least 25 
per cent” (Tarp, 2006, p. 13). In addition to these financial flows, technical co-operation is 
included in ODA, while grants, loans, and credits for military purposes are excluded, 
regardless of their concessionality (Hjertholm & White, 2000, p. 16). 
In the light of development theories, the theoretical background and justification of aid has 
been explored (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2009; McGillivray, Feeny, Hermes, & Lensink, 2006). 
In economic theory, foreign aid is based on “gap models”. Basically these models assert that 
the rate of economic growth is constrained by inadequate levels of savings and foreign 
exchange. Foreign aid is required to fill these gaps in order to achieve a target rate of 
growth. The well known Harrod-Domar growth model assumes an excess supply of labour in 
developing countries and that growth is constrained only by the availability and productivity 
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of capital.  The availability of capital is determined by the level of savings, and to achieve 
growth the government must increase savings or increase the productivity of capital. 
However, these gap models do not say much about institutions, which are the focus of this 
thesis, and it is necessary now to turn to the role of aid in particular and trace ideas about 
its relationships to different types of institutions. 
 
2.3 Aid Debates 
Early debates on foreign aid focussed on the determinants behind, and amount allocated to, 
foreign aid.  The question of whether the amount of aid delivered was enough or not has 
been an issue of discussion for years.  More recently, the question of aid effectiveness has 
emerged, with questions arising as to whether aid is working or not and to what extent.  The 
amount allocated, the motives behind, and effectiveness of aid are somehow interlinked in 
aid debates and practice. The motives of aid determine the amount delivered, which to 
some extent determines its effectiveness. However, the current debate seems to obscure 
the aid motive argument and instead focuses on the impact of aid. 
Determinants of foreign aid have been explored extensively in the literature, and factors 
that determine aid have implications for its impact. For instance, there are those who 
contend that objectives of aid have been distorted by politics and trade gains (Tarp & 
Hjertholm, 2000). These objectives imply that sometimes donors pursue their own interests 
in giving aid (Berthélemy, 2004).  On top of these reasons for giving aid there is a moral and 
ethical agenda (Riddell, 2007, p. 55). Also, the progression of foreign assistance has been 
fashioned by the ideological debate that contains it (Thérien, 2002). These have been 
identified as reasons for the failure of aid to deliver on its promises. However, authors have 
observed that even the discussion concerning failure or success has been dominated by 
politics and ideology rather than the real motive of assistance (Mavrotas, 2007). Literature 
on aid effectiveness cannot be judged easily due to the inconclusive debate but aid, where 
appropriate, still serves its purpose (Riddell, 2007, p. 56).   
The motives and multiple objectives of giving aid point to a second part of the debate, which 
questions the impact of aid. The debate about whether aid works or not is a long-standing 
one. Early criticisms of aid effectiveness can be traced to the 1970s; for instance, the notion 
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that economic growth from foreign aid did not result in development for the people, and in 
some cases made them worse off (Griffin, 1970). Criticisms continued in the 1980s, that 
there was very little evidence that aid offered more opportunity to improve the recipients’ 
balance of payments or that improving balance of payments made aid effective (Mosley, 
1980).  
Apart from post-development critics who disregard the whole official development agenda, 
early mainstream self-evaluation of the impact of aid came from a study commissioned by 
the World Bank and IMF (Cassen & Associates, 1986). While acknowledging critics of aid on 
both practical and theoretical grounds, this study concluded that most aid succeeds in 
achieving its own objectives, though at the same time aid does have its downsides (Cassen 
& Associates, 1986, p. 361). A comprehensive assessment was done by the World Bank 
again in its 1998 research report entitled Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and 
Why. In this report, successes and failures of aid were recorded, and conditions under which 
aid can work better were explained, such as in the need for good policy environments 
(World-Bank, 1998).  
The trend of the debate points in two major directions. First, the earlier focus was on the 
motives and objectives of aid (Mavrotas, 2007) such as the securitisation of humanitarian 
aid, which sharpened the focus especially post 9/11 (Shannon, 2009). Second, the debate 
based on the impact of aid, negative or positive. The second direction has both critics and 
defenders.  
Critics of aid from both developed and developing countries have argued that aid does not 
work, especially in the current form. Aid is said to be causing corruption. For 
instance ,Dambisa Moyo’s  book Dead Aid claims that foreign aid is the cause of Africa’s 
problems and calls for aid to be shut off in five years in favour of more trade (Moyo, 2009, p. 
25). Another cause of aid failure is suggested as planning bureaucracy, and it is argued that 
changes need to be made to let beneficiaries search for their own answers. Overall, Easterly  
(2006) argues that aid in its current form does more harm than good. 
On the other hand, aid has been defended and it is argued that it is bringing the desired 
effects. This is represented by research pointing to the kind of desired effects and conditions 
necessary for aid to work. Most such studies have focused on the aid-growth connection 
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and have not been conclusive (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2009). According to this view aid 
could be effective and achieve its objectives mainly through economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Conditions under which aid will achieve its objectives are varied, but mainly 
require recipient countries to have good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. Aid has little or 
no positive impact in absence of these policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2000, p. 866). Other 
studies show that although aid has a positive impact on economic growth there is no 
evidence of it ensuring good policies and aid effectiveness (Dalgaard & Hansen, 2001; 
Hansen & Tarp, 2000, 2001).  Some studies show that aid influences the policy environment 
positively, but there is less evidence to support the argument that aid only works in good 
policy environments (Morrissey, 2001, p. 48). This raises the institutional impact of aid 
especially in the current set up of dialogue between many players. 
The non-economic growth focus of aid effectiveness is shared mostly by development 
practitioners. This perspective argues that despite the shortcomings of aid, it is actually 
working, but in some contexts only (Calderisi, 2007; Riddell, 2007). There is plenty of 
evidence of official development aid contributing positively and substantially to different 
areas of lives of people such as improving skills, quality of services, physical infrastructure, 
production, incomes and well-being among others. However, some aid has clearly not 
worked well and some has had adverse effects. Overall aid has contributed positively but 
not made as a big difference as it was intended to (Riddell, 2007, p. 255).  The aid 
effectiveness debate becomes reformative at this stage. Calls are made, even by the critics 
of aid agenda, to reform approaches in order to realise greater benefits. For instance, the 
case is made for more manageable aid programmes that address vital issues and ultimately 
reduce to a world where no aid is involved as things get better (Moyo, 2009, p. 82). Easterly 
(2006) further claims that aid can make a difference if the industry abandons its 
bureaucratic planning culture and leaves room for recipients to search for answers for 
themselves. Major shifts in thinking and practice are suggested to ensure aid becomes 
effective (Joseph & Gillies, 2009; Riddell, 2007). Despite these calls for aid reform, there are 
few practical suggestions so far as to how aid should be reformed. Some of the key 
suggested changes involve removing different types of barriers including policy 
conditionality (Burnell, 2008; Killick, 2008), restoring national sovereignty (Jenkins, 2008), 
and getting rid of a rigid planning culture (Easterly, 2008) . Also aid should gradually follow 
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some practical steps such as to reduce malaria and provide more clean water (Easterly, 2007, 
p. 331). 
In the context of this study, institutions involved in aid delivery and development processes 
matter.  Aid effectiveness depends on institutional quality (McGillivray, et al., 2006). 
Institutions here involve actors and processes in aid dialogue and delivery mechanisms. The 
quality engagement of institutions is important. There is evidence showing that aid cannot 
be effective as long as donors’ motives, tools of analysis, and complexity of processes that 
link aid to development outcomes remain unclear (Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007).  This 
identifies the research gap and the focus of this study.  
 
2.4 Dominant development theory and institutional impact 
Foreign aid or development assistance is inseparable from development theories. 
Development theories have influenced principles and provision of aid across time, although 
in practice other motives apart from altruism play a major role. Dominant development 
theories have determined institutions mandated to make development or progress happen.   
Aid started under the influence of modernisation theory (1960s-1970s). Aid in the 
modernisation era focused on state building. The state was the key institution to plan and 
implement development programmes. The earliest origin of foreign aid in this context is 
closely related to colonialism when colonial governments gave “subsidies” to their colonies 
(Bowen, 1998). These subsidies were not only meant to facilitate colonial administrators do 
their work properly, but also assisted them to construct basic infrastructure for movements 
of raw materials, minerals, and other resources to home countries. This helped to build 
colonial governments’ institutional presence and function. 
Modernisation theory was informed by Rostow’s stages of economic growth, the “take-off” 
model (Rostow, 1956) among them. The take-off model encouraged importation of foreign 
capital in the form of loans and aid. Development strategies focussed on assisting 
developing nations with balance-of-payments, project aid, and technical assistance 
facilitated by multilateral and bilateral agencies. Institutionally, the state was given most 
power to plan and deliver development to its citizens. Modernisation was enhanced by 
Point Four of President Harry Truman’s speech on January 20, 1949  (Bowen, 1998).  
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President Truman suggested that developed nations must use their technological power to 
assist countries and people in poverty.  Aid started to focus on poverty and the 
improvement of poor people’s welfare through technical cooperation between the donor 
country and the recipient nation. For instance, 35 countries signed the “Point Four 
Agreement of Technical Cooperation” in 1951. It was the first US Government response to 
the problem of poverty (McVety, 2008).   
Development was demarcated by the ideological divide between Western capitalism and 
Eastern communism. In 1960s-1970s aid modality on the Western side was both 
programme and project aid.  In practice, development focussed on building the state so that 
the state could manage economic growth and provide for its own citizens.  Policy planning 
and implementation were centralised. At the same time, markets were assumed to function 
effectively.  There is a general consensus that the motive was really to counter the supposed 
threat of communism in developing countries and promote American interests and 
influence (Berthélemy, 2004; Hjertholm & White, 2000; Kanbur, 2003).  Also, as “point four” 
of President Truman’s speech puts it: “their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them 
and to more prosperous areas”, which implies that dealing with poverty and inequality is 
important to address global and regional security issues (Escobar, 1995, p. 1).   
Modernisation was opposed in practice by dependency theory. Dependency theory had 
roots in Marxism and Keynesian economics. Initially economists at the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), led by Prebisch, came up with a theory of 
structuralism. Marxist perspectives were added by key contributors of dependency theory, 
especially André Gunder Frank. Dependency theory represented a critique of the 
development paths, policies, and strategies followed in Latin America and elsewhere in the 
periphery (Conway & Heynen, 2008), including Africa (Amin, 1976, 1992).  Dependency 
theory stood against unequal commercial arrangements that were brought by the free 
market notion of Ricardian comparative advantage.  Structural changes were proposed in 
development policy switching to more domestic production under tariff protection to 
replace industrial imports and reduce dependency. Also, capital goods, intermediate 
products, and energy production would be negotiated with transnational corporations – a 
development strategy known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). ISI was widely 
practised in Latin America and the Third World in general (Conway and Heynen, 2008). The 
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strategy failed because it generated new forms of dependence on external capital including 
aid. Dependency theory shifted the focus towards self-reliance and development from 
within.  Dependency theory was rarely translated into practice with the exception of ISI 
strategies. The focus of development assistance under ISI was on heavy industrial machinery. 
ISI built to some extend the capacity of the state through its regulatory power and 
infrastructure provision.  Notably, however, dependency theory echoed modernisation 
theory in its objective to build the development capacity of the state and its institutions.  
In today’s era of neoliberalism dependency theory still echoes, at least in theory. For 
instance, the literature outlines some key examples in which dependency plays a major role; 
for example, aid dependency, technological dependency, dependency on foreign capital 
investment, trade dependency, and dependency on better human capital formation 
(Conway & Heynen, 2008, p. 95; Ghosh, 2001, p. 133).  
In current practice, some authors argue, the dominant development ideology that guides 
strategies and interventions is neoliberalism (Craig & Porter, 2006, p. 63). However, this 
contemporary form of neoliberalism has borrowed development themes from other 
“populist” theories such as participation and environmental sustainability (from alternative 
development) and gender issues (from feminism), but the central tenets of neoliberalism in 
aid delivery and development remain unchanged, namely the focus on market rather than 
state-led approaches. 
Aid in neoliberalism has taken on a complex role.  Neoliberalism is simply the promotion of 
the free market economy globally, based on the belief that benefits will trickle down to 
every participant and bring about economic and social development.  In this context 
neoliberalism can be traced to the early 1980s.  Neoliberalism was a response to the poor 
performance of modernisation theory in practice. Even when economic growth was 
recorded much of the general population felt little benefit, in what has been labelled by 
some as “growth without development” (Binns, 2008, p. 85), and there was a realisation 
that the post-war development model had resulted in growth which did not translate into 
development or redistribution of the benefits of growth to the poor (Brock, Cornwell, & 
Gaventa, 2001).   
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The problem of poor performance of modernisation was made worse by the economic 
crises due to rising oil prices, tax revolts, and the debt servicing problems of developing 
nations in the 1970s. Also, changes in governments and policies in the US and the UK, where 
radical right wing governments came to power, accelerated the turn to neoliberalism. At 
this time the World Bank, IMF, and US Treasury joined forces to direct the world economy. 
The “Washington Consensus” as it became known (Williamson, 1990) introduced Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAPs) as instruments to spearhead economic policy reforms. In 
development theory, neoliberalism reigned, led by the Washington-based international 
financial institutions (IFIs) with other donors following. The failure of the former 
development strategies was attributed to state involvement in the economy and especially 
to failed domestic policies in developing countries. The Washington-based institutions 
devised a development strategy focussing on “policy based lending” or using loans to 
encourage structural changes (Moss, 2007, p. 28).  Institutionally, the supposedly inefficient 
state was supposed to give way to markets in the areas of economic and development 
leadership.  
SAPs targeted a reduction in government intervention, cutting expenditure and regulation, 
while also promoting liberalisation and international trade.  The state was pushed out to 
encourage economic growth and let the private sector handle the economy.  Critics  argue 
that SAPs were driven by northern self-interest and a determination to protect the 
international financial system (Simon, 2008, p. 87). Economic conditionality under SAPs was 
complemented in 1990 by political conditionality when the British and other donors 
imposed “good governance” as a prerequisite for recipient countries (Simon, 2008, p. 88).  
In order to get financial support, countries had to accept these conditions and pre-approved 
economic policies. The previous focus on poverty was “short-lived due to the doctrine of 
neoliberalism” (Storey, Bulloch, & Overton, 2005, p. 32).  SAPs intended to relieve the state 
from business activities and reduce bureaucracy, letting the “free” market control economic 
activities and accrue benefits to the people including the poor.  In other words, IFIs were 
using loans to encourage structural changes (Moss, 2007, p. 30). 
Structural Adjustment Policies failed to deliver expectations. Recipient states became too 
weak to govern their own economies and many people fell into the poverty trap.  Countries 
that adopted SAPs experienced problems. Studies show that women, children, and the poor 
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in particular suffered most when state support mechanisms were withdrawn (Radcliffe, 
2004, p. 65).  IFIs expected that structural adjustment would increase foreign direct 
investment, but unfortunately this did not occur as expected in most countries (Simon, 2008, 
p. 89).  
The IFIs gradually made changes to SAPs in order to include measures that would address 
poverty reduction. IFIs introduced Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (1999) in 
order to return the state in its rightful place (Kelly, 2008). PRSPs were meant to transfer 
policy ownership to recipient nations, and especially to state institutions. The state was 
once again entrusted to lead the market to deliver benefits to its citizens. 
The introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers was intended to replace SAPs and 
put poverty at centre stage again. PRSPs aimed to increase aid effectiveness, which is the 
overall focus of policy conditionality.  PRSPs are prerequisites for the IMF’s Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support 
Credit (PRSC).  PRGF is the IMF’s low interest lending facility for low-income countries, while 
PRSCs are the World Bank’s policy-based loans. PRSPs are supposed to be country owned 
development initiatives, prepared by governments with the active participation of civil 
society and other development partners (IMF, 2009). The Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) was recently replaced by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) under a newly 
created arm of the IMF, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), which is carrying 
out the same activities but with more focussed and tailored conditionality (IMF, 2010). 
PRSPs are considered by the IMF and World Bank as the basis for concessional lending and 
debt relief under the joint Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative since 1999. “The 
targets and policy conditions in a PRGF-supported program are drawn from the country’s 
PRSP” (IMF, 2009).   Several bilateral donors such as the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden also use PRSPs as the basis for their aid. Many other donor agencies ear-mark their 
sector support in line with PRSP objectives and outcomes. 
PRSPs are based on five principles. These argue that development aid should be: 
1. Country-driven, involving broad-based participation 
2. Comprehensive, in recognition that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon 
3. Results-oriented, with emphasis on concrete results for the poor 
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4. Partnership-oriented, leading to better donor co-ordination under government 
leadership 
5. Based on a long-term perspective (IMF & Word-Bank, 1999).  
 
PRSPs were set to correct many institutional shortcomings; in particular, two main problems 
of donor-recipient relationships (Dijkstra, 2005). First, many studies had concluded that the 
practice of setting conditions for policies was not very effective, and that domestic political-
economy factors determined the extent of the implementation of conditions (Dijkstra, 2002; 
Dollar & Svensson, 2000; Svensson, 2003).  Second, many aid donors saw the need for more 
co-ordination of donor efforts (Dijkstra, 2005; Kanbur, 2003). This was due to each donor 
implementing their own project with their own reporting requirements and undermining 
domestic institutional capacity development. 
PRSPs had problems of their own too. First, PRSPs were a prerequisite in order for a country 
to qualify for aid and debt relief (Dijkstra, 2005). This has been called “process conditionality” 
(Burnell, 2008, p. 505). This condition still applies to date as stipulated by the IMF PRGF fact 
sheet (IMF, 2010). This “policy and institutional conditionality” is differentiated from the 
formal provisions of funding and various agreements written in contracts (Killick, 2008, p. 
511). In process conditionality, donors required recipients to address Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to which aid and debt relief were increasingly tied.  It is argued that 
the term “country ownership” itself is a form of conditionality considering that a “country” 
is not a single agent but made up of many stakeholders (Buiter, 2007, p. 650). In theory and 
practice, SAPs were mirrored in PRSPs because fiscal and monetary policies, as well as 
institutional and economic reforms, were still required for the Completion Point of the HIPC 
Initiative (Dijkstra, 2002). 
In theory, IFIs had removed policy conditionality but, in practice, conditions were actually 
reinforced. For instance, content analysis of PRSPs has indicated that the main elements of 
SAPs retained donor-driven policies (Riddell, 2007, p. 187). Further, the fact that IFIs’ 
intentions were to promote country-owned development policies but prescribing standard 
PRSPs, indicates that they intended to sustain policy dominance. Some developing countries 
had their own development strategies in place which were ignored in favour of PRSPs 
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(Storey, et al., 2005, p. 37). Advocates of PRSPs claim that country-owned, participatory-
prepared strategies were either vague statements of political aspiration or of operational 
plans with narrow focus in contrast to PRPs’ more comprehensive approach (Driscoll & 
Evans, 2005, p. 7). It is also claimed that these documents were “merely symbolic and had 
little impact on the actual budget and policies” (Ohno, 2002, p. 6) or, in some cases, 
preparation of these plans was not sufficiently participatory (Marshall, Woodroffe, & Kjell, 
2001, p. 7).  Early examination of PRSPs concluded that civil society groups were unsatisfied 
with the extent of public consultation and participation in preparation of PRSPs. Likewise, 
country and government ownership of PRSPs was weakened by the continued influence of 
the IMF and the World Bank.  Most importantly, the policies included in PRSPs did not have 
clear poverty reducing objectives (Marshall, et al., 2001, p. 1). 
All in all, PRSPs reinvigorated the poverty debate. The difference was that the “new” 
poverty agenda was now the main preoccupation of the major actors in development, the 
IFIs (Maxwell, 2001).  Neoliberalism had rolled the power of the state back and at the same 
time incorporated poverty at centre stage in economic development. 
In 2000 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) at the Millennium Summit. The initial eight goals were set to be achieved by 2015. 
These goals had 18 targets and 48 associated indicators. About 190 countries signed the 
resolution, which others have labelled unprecedented given the fact that the goals 
themselves were not new (Rigg, 2008, p. 30).  Eradicating poverty was the first goal, while 
the last goal was to “develop a global partnership for development”, mainly comprising 
issues of development assistance. 
The MDGs were therefore not new initiatives as these goals were heavily influenced by the 
OECD’s International Development Targets (IDTs) (OECD, 1996).  While the IDTs aimed to 
mainstream aid for poverty reduction, they were criticised by some as being unachievable 
(Hanmer & Naschold, 2000, p. 34). Despite these criticisms the UN MDGs reflected most of 
the OECD targets.  The OECD, with its consortium of donors, has had great influence in aid 
effectiveness since the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), the 
declaration of the High-Level Forum on Harmonisation (Rome, 2003), the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005), and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). Recipient countries 
 18 
 
were involved in signing most of these declarations and commitments, including the MDGs, 
as partners in development and subsequently as “owners of development processes”.  
The new efforts to address poverty came from major global development agencies such as 
OECD’s DAC and IFIs. These efforts included Poverty Reduction Papers and Sector Wide 
Approaches (Hanley, 2001). The MDGs and PRSPs constituted “a new construction on 
poverty reduction” in aid and international negotiation and consultation (Maxwell, 2003). 
The MDGs have received both criticism and support since their inception. The most recent 
criticisms are directed at the targets and underlying principles - for instance, the fact that 
the MDGs are misinterpreted as applying “one-size-fits-all” or “blanket” targets 
(Vandemoortele, 2009, p. 356). The choice of numerical targets to measure success or 
failure of the MDGs was therefore considered a problem (Easterly, 2009), along with the 
fact that expectations of aid and development success were set too high (Clemens, Kenny, & 
Moss, 2007, p. 746). 
The current global aid structure is shaped by a new form of neoliberalism and perhaps it has 
now departed from neoliberalism in that it foresees a renewed role for the state. The focus 
on poverty reduction and the role of the state to lead and own development processes is 
said to have much in common with a development approach called neostructuralism, which 
is “designed to sustain the free market economy politically”  (Murray & Overton, 2011, p. 
13).  
 
2.5 Aid Modalities and changing landscapes of Foreign Aid 
2.5.1 Global Aid Structure: The Paris Declaration 
The Millennium Development Goals are meant to be contextualized in national 
development strategies, namely PRSPs. The localised MDGs provide a platform to compare 
progress within a country and between countries.  The build up to more concerted efforts 
on aid effectiveness is meant to address main problems on the side of both donors and 
recipients. Up until this time donors delivered aid mainly in form of projects that were 
fragmented and sometimes in duplication.  
The Rome High Level Forum in February 2003 was a follow-up meeting to Monterrey 
Consensus to improve development effectiveness involving donors and recipient countries.  
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The Rome Declaration reiterated donors’ concerns about high and unproductive transaction 
costs associated with processes for preparing, delivering, and monitoring development 
assistance and recipients’ concerns that, donors practices do not always fit well with 
national development priorities and systems.  The Declaration called for urgent and 
coordinated action to improve aid effectiveness by recommending that donors let recipients 
assume a stronger leadership role; that is, to coordinate development assistance through 
country-based approaches that emphasise country ownership and government leadership.  
Donors promised to assist partner countries capacity building to implement and monitor 
diverse aid modalities such as projects, sector approaches, and budget or balance-of-
payments support including engagement with civil society and the private sector (OECD, 
2003).  When the Rome Declaration on Harmonization addressed these issues, most of the 
deliberations – such as PRSPs and the MDGs – were in processes already.  
In the light of the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, new aid 
modalities were designed to operate with greater impact especially using broad national 
development strategies in the form of PRSPs.  The Paris Declaration was organised by the 
OECD with bilaterals, multilaterals, recipient governments, and civil society agreeing to the 
Declaration’s principles of aid effectiveness.  The Declaration had five major principles to 
guide action: local ownership of development strategies; donors’ alignment with national 
development strategies and systems;, donors’ harmonization of development interventions;, 
managing for results; and mutual accountability amongst donors and recipients (OECD, 
2005). Later the Accra Agenda for Action clarified the role of non-state actors, especially civil 
society actors (OECD, 2008).   
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness added a more comprehensive practical approach 
towards aid effectiveness through five principles; recipient country ownership, donor 
alignment, donor harmonisation, mutual accountability, and managing for results (OECD, 
2005). The five commitments between donors and partner countries mean to provide 
specific targets and measurable indicators of progress towards aid effectiveness and, 
ultimately, development. 
First, the country ownership principle stipulates roles for both recipients and donors. 
Country ownership for recipients entails partner countries’ commitment to three key issues: 
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(1) to exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development 
strategies in broad consultation; (2) to translate these national development strategies into 
priorities, results-oriented operational programmes expressed through medium-term 
expenditure frameworks (MTEFs), and annual budgets; and (3) to take the lead in co-
ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with 
donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector.  Donors 
committed themselves to one particular issue with regards to country ownership: to respect 
partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it. 
The second commitment agreed to is alignment. Alignment has three key issues: (1) donors 
have to align with partners’ strategies, institutions, and procedures to deliver aid and 
donors’ conditions will be made based on partner countries national development strategies; 
(2) alignment implies that partner countries will strengthen their capacity development with 
support from donors on national development strategies, procurement systems, and 
financial management capacity; and (3) donors commit to untie aid to realise better value 
for money spent.  
The third principle is harmonisation. This commitment ensures donors’ actions are 
harmonised, transparent, and collectively effective. Donors are committed to implementing 
common arrangements with simple procedures, to working together with a clear division of 
labour, and to giving incentives where partners exhibit collaborative behaviour.  Other 
issues in harmonising efforts were to deliver aid to fragile states and promoting concerted 
environmental assessments. 
Fourthly, donors and partners agreed on managing for results. This aims to enhance 
managing resources and improving decision-making for results.  Recipients will lead 
evaluation and reviews of development initiatives, donors will participate in these 
evaluation to ensure mutual ownership of results. 
Finally, donors and partners committed to mutual accountability. Both donors and partners 
are mutually accountable for development results.  Partner countries agreed to strengthen 
the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets, and reinforce 
participatory approaches to ensure a broad range of development partners is involved when 
formulating and assessing progress in implementation of national development strategies. 
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Donors commit to providing timely, transparent, and comprehensive information on aid 
flows to enable partner countries to present comprehensive budget reports to their 
legislatures and citizens.  Partner countries and donors agree to use existing country-level 
processes to jointly assess mutual progress in executing approved commitments on aid 
effectiveness and partnership. 
These principles were stressed in the Accra Agenda for Action by adding more weight to 
engaging with recipients’ local non-state actors (OECD, 2008).   
The global aid structure has rendered a great many processes and activities at country-level 
resulting in an increased number of activities required within donors and between donors 
and the recipient government and or civil society. Increasingly, aid delivery instruments had 
to be changed to reflect more local ownership and the use of local systems and procedures.  
The changes were designed to have a number of clear outcome – to combine efforts on 
debt relief, keep focus on poverty reduction, and put the recipient government in the 
“driving seat” (de-Haan & Everest-Phillips, 2010). 
The term “aid modality” describes the way in which official development assistance (ODA) is 
administered and delivered (DCI, 2004).   Aid modalities have increasingly changed from 
traditional projects to sector-wide approaches and budget support.  
Projects are instruments that deliver aid to an agreed set of outputs in order to contribute 
to solving a particular problem in a specified time, in most cases in the short-term.  Donors 
are usually strongly involved in identifying, negotiating, designing, and implementing 
projects.  There is no official definition of project support although some institutions have 
tried to define it; for instance, the World Health Organization (Antunes, Carrin, & Evans, 
2008) and the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (Bandstein, 2007). Project 
support is defined as funds provided to implement a specific and predefined set of 
development activities over a specified period of time. Project support characteristically 
uses separate management structures and detailed objectives, activities, and expenditures 
(Bandstein, 2007; Foster & Fozzard, 2000). There are two different types of projects: 
projects that use parallel systems (donor’s and government’s), and projects that use a 
government system exclusively (Bandstein, 2007; Foster & Leavy, 2001). It is argued by 
some that projects are donor-driven, and cannot be sustained after development partners 
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cease their funding (Antunes, et al., 2008).  Despite strong calls to change towards budget 
support, many donors still use projects as instruments to deliver aid.  Donors perceive that 
projects offer the opportunity of a narrow, concentrated focus, visibility for the donor, and 
clear attribution of specific activities and outcomes to the donor intervention (DCI, 2004). 
However, there are problems associated with that because, as projects focus more on 
capital investment, there are inadequate links to the policy environment which would have 
otherwise contributed to success and long-term impact. Other problems are that projects 
increase transaction costs for governments, and implement donors’ priorities instead of the 
government’s (Antunes, et al., 2008).  
The drawbacks of projects led to adoption of Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps). According 
to DCI (2004) there is still a legitimate role for projects for two reasons; first, as a way of 
managing government interventions, and, second, as a mode of intervention for donors 
where there is coherence with national programmes. Also, the project mode may be more 
relevant or less harmful in some sectors, such as infrastructure, and more relevant for pilot 
and experimental interventions and to support civil society (DCI, 2004).  Projects are popular 
among line ministries especially when resources are channelled directly through them with 
minimal interference by core ministries such as the ministry of finance or planning (Antunes, 
et al., 2008). 
Changing aid modality from late 1990s to 2000s has encouraged donors to deliver aid on the 
grounds of recipient governments’ planning and budgeting cycle and, whenever possible, to 
use local disbursement systems. In this era, aid delivery modality increasingly changed 
towards Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) and Budget Support in an effort to coordinate 
programmes and to sustain impact. 
SWAps have been defined as an aid modality in which all significant funding for the sector 
supports a single sector policy, under government leadership, adopting common 
approaches across the sector, and relying on government procedures. According to Foster 
and Leavy (2001), the modality emerged as a response to three issues. First, donors found 
that conditionality in general did not work, and sector approaches became a way of 
providing support against government commitment and track record in providing services 
for poverty reduction.  Second, the emergence of sector approaches was an attempt to 
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focus support on creating a sound policy environment. This was meant to influence changes 
in policies and institutions.  Third, public expenditure frameworks and management provide 
a solution to fragmentation in budgeting processes, especially in the period when much 
spending was done outside the government’s budget and reliance was on donor rather than 
government financial management. A SWAp is a broad process, and therefore pooled funds, 
sector budget support, and projects may all be legitimate ways of supporting a SWAp (DCI, 
2004, p. 5). 
Budget support follows many of the ideas of SWAps with a few exceptions. SWAps’ basic 
principles in budget support are applied to cross-sectoral frameworks and typically in the 
context of fiscal reforms.  Budget support is defined as aid where (i) funds are channelled 
through the national treasury; and (ii) the allocation and management of these funds 
respects national priorities and procedures. Budget support concentrates on outcomes 
rather than outputs and emphasises recipient country ownership of policies and 
programmes. There are two main types of budget support – General Budget Support (GBS) 
and Sector Budget Support (SBS) (Antunes, et al., 2008). General Budget Support channels 
resources into the government’s budget while Sector Budget Support funds specific sectors 
such as education and the relevant ministry decides how the funds are used.  Budget 
support is a renewed concept of forms of programmatic support such as balance-of-
payments and sector loans that have been in operation for a long time (DCI, 2004, p. 6).  
Budget support focuses on broader agreements about government policies especially in 
agreed policy matrix (Antunes, et al., 2008; DCI, 2004). 
The nature of GBS involves lack of earmarking of resources to specific sectors or even 
activities. The national government allocates money to sectors according to national 
development priorities and sector needs. In this way Poverty Reduction Papers (PRSPs) are 
the basis for most negotiations and policy engagements on GBS. It is expected that GBS 
results will mature in the long term especially on cross-cutting sector reforms to overall 
better governance. Funds in SBS are earmarked to ensure that the government spends the 
funds rather than retaining them in central banks as currency reserves or using them for 
debt repayments as is possible with GBS.  
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Budget support is associated with two key issues, predictability and conditionality. 
Predictability, in most cases is demanded of donors by recipient governments so that long 
term plans can be made with knowledge of resources available.  Conversely, conditions have 
been imposed by donors on recipient government whereby funds are gradually released by 
donors in instalments subject to recipient government accomplishing a set of conditions.  
Conditions in most cases deal with accountability and transparency and or overall good 
governance especially in using funds. This is termed fiduciary conditionality (Antunes, et al., 
2008) whereby disbursement of funds will be continued only if recipient countries show 
accountability in their public financial management.  
Figure 2.1 Characteristics of the major instruments for development 
 
Source: Antunnes, et al. (2008, p. 4) 
Figure 2.1 shows aid modalities and their focus, management, risks associated, and results 
expected. A SWAp in this framework involves new aid modalities especially budget support. 
Most SWAps are still at the Sector Budget Support level where a sector such as education is 
targeted and donors strongly earmark funds. SWAps at this level focus on both short-term 
and long-term delivery of results.  Donors want to control both financial accountability and 
fiduciary risks.  There is more engagement between donors and recipient government at 
this level; it is almost a split control. In practice this causes a lot of confusion in policy-
making when there is a combination of projects involving SBS and GBS at the same time. In 
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some instances, donors are in full control hence donor-driven, while in other areas the 
domestic stakeholders under the government leadership are in full control, that is, country-
driven or central government-driven. 
 
2.5.2 Aid Modality and Institutional Impact 
Over the years the ways in which donors give aid have evolved.  Literature focussing 
specifically on aid modality is scarce.  However, the aid modality debate has been addressed, 
especially with respect to how aid modality affects development effectiveness (Ohno & 
Niiya, 2004). Also, different types of aid modalities and instruments have been used over 
time (Foster & Leavy, 2001). The type of aid modality depended on the focus and purpose of 
aid in the particular period and context.  The focus of aid has taken various directions such 
as fostering institutions, dominant ideology, and donor focus (Hjertholm & White, 2000), 
based on development priorities (Ohno & Niiya, 2004), and aid principles (Overton, 2009). 
Aid modality in the 1940s, during the era of the Marshall Plan, was largely programme aid in 
the form of meeting balance-of-payments deficits.  Later, in the 1950s during the era of 
community development, the dominant aid modality was food and project aid.  In the 1960s 
the focus of aid was on infrastructure, hence the prime aid modality involved projects and 
budget support. When the focus of development shifted to basic needs in the 1970s, aid 
modality shifted to programme aid for import support.  Aid modalities under SAPs (in the 
1980s) involved programme aid and balance-of-payments support in the form of structural 
adjustment and sectoral adjustment loans. Later, since the 1990s, the dominant aid 
modality has been sector support. This is still the dominant aid modality in the form of 
programme aid which includes budget support (general and sector), pooling funds under 
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps), and pooled Technical Assistance (TA) (Foster & Leavy, 
2001; Hjertholm & White, 2000; Ohno & Niiya, 2004; Overton, 2009).  
The ever-changing nature of the dominant aid modality has accompanied changes in the 
emphasis of particular institutions in the development landscape. No single modality aid has 
been followed in a particular period, but rather a combination of modalities. Aid modalities 
reflect the dominant development theory of a particular period in history and its policy 
influence. While, there is little in the literature about the form of aid modality in relation to 
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its impact on recipient government and civil society capacity for development, the literature 
does, however, hint at the relationship between aid modality and the roles and strategy of 
development. Table 2.1 is an attempt to link dominant aid modalities and their impact on 
domestic institutions in the recipient country. 
 
Table 2.1 Aid Modality and institutional impact 
Period Theory Dominant Aid 
Modality 
Institutional impact on 
developing country 
Pre-& 1950s Modernization Programme aid Colonial administration  
1960s Modernization Project, programme aid Strong central 
government capacity  
1970s Dependency Project /Programme 
aid 
Strong local councils, 
communities, and Civil 
Society  
1980s Neoliberalism Programme aid Weak central 
government and local 
government. The rise of 
civil society 
1990s Neoliberalism/Poverty 
Agenda 
Project aid Local councils, 
communities, and Civil 
Society capacity 
strengthened 
2000s New Poverty 
Agenda/Neostructuralis
m 
General Budget 
Support and SWAps 
Strong central 
government 
Source: Author, 2010 
 
2.6 Conceptual framework: Aid, the State, Local Government and Civil Society 
Conceptually, the state is accountable for the development of its citizens. In the situation 
where the state is not able to fulfil this role, then a vacuum is created and filled by other 
institutions, foreign or local. Ideally the relationship between donor and recipient is based 
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on an equal partnership (Burnell, 2008).  In this sense no one partner has power over the 
other and accountability is based on mutual respect and trust. In practice, however, the 
donor has greater power to shape aid and conditionality. Aid in the current modality has put 
the state at the centre of development activities, including governance and policy-making. 
One of the core principles of the Paris Declaration is country ownership, which entails 
government leadership in formulating and implementing consultatively national 
development strategies. Consultation with civil society and the private sector was enhanced 
by the Accra Agenda for Action.  Ideally, central government is supposed to lead policy 
discussions and implementation. Civil society and the private sector are expected to 
participate in policy dialogue when central government engages with donors.  Local 
government, on the other hand, is expected to formulate local policies and implement 
national policies at the district scale. Space for policy dialogue is expected to open up at 
both the national and district levels. However, the literature reveals that in practice various 
and often contradicting agendas, issues of governance and policy conditionality, erode 
national sovereignty giving donors more power (Jenkins, 2008, p. 517).  Changing aid 
modalities have brought various players together or moved them apart. The influence of 
this differentiated process can be located by research on whether diverse players have 
gained differently in terms of bargaining power and their relationship to the end users – in 
this case communities. The literature points out that the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness has two major problems. First, donors have placed great emphasis on the 
mechanics of aid delivery rather than on progress and the impact of aid. Second, key 
development stakeholders, such as local governments and civil society, have not been 
sufficiently involved in the policy discussions. This has meant that processes subsequent to 
the Paris Declaration have failed to deliver aid effectively. The impact of aid processes on 
the relationship between national and local governments in the context of the principles of 
the Paris Declaration has received only limited research analysis (UCLG, 2009).  
Changing aid modalities have had different institutional impacts.  Project support focuses on 
short-term delivery of results with strong emphasis on financial accountability. Most 
projects were or are implemented at the district level or government agency level. This has 
made them donor-driven. Although many projects are efficient in terms of local or district 
level institutional strengthening, they may be detrimental at the national level. Programmes 
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tend to strengthen the budgetary capacity of the recipient government. This gives some 
control of resources and the economy of the recipient government. Programmes are good 
for the recipient governments but are not good for the aid donors in terms of limited means 
to enforce accountability. 
Despite good outcomes, both anticipated and realised, in changing aid modalities, the gap 
between theory and practice is still obvious. Early evidence from donor research on sector 
and budget support indicates a strengthening of central governments in planning and 
implementation of sector policies and programmes but, at the same time, marginalisation of 
the responsibility of local government.  It is argued that there is a lack of involvement of 
local government representatives and other non-state actors in helping to inform and shape 
the design and planning of development policies and programs such as PRSPs (European-
Commission, 2008; UCLG, 2009). This is just one preliminary negative impact of the new aid 
modality. A number of evaluations found that traditional SWAps have increased the 
centralisation of service delivery and disempowered local governments (UNDP, 2007).  On 
the other hand, local government officials were found to be agents of central governments 
(Craig & Porter, 2003). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This review has revealed a gap in the literature on the impact of changing aid modalities on 
institutional capacity, especially at the level of local government and civil society. Also, 
research and debate about aid and the new aid modality tend to point to national level 
actors as engaging well in policy formulation and implementation, an assertion which needs 
to be subjected to further research.   There has been limited research done to explore the 
quality of engagement in policy-making processes and inclusion of key actors at the local 
level.  The local performance of the Paris Declaration principles has not been studied. 
Literature does not explain the extent to which changing aid modality has impacted local 
decision-making and policy implementation. Furthermore, there is limited evidence on the 
degree district level priorities including community initiatives and priorities fit in the new aid 
modality policy-making and implementation.  In addition, the reaction of district-based 
stakeholders in the new aid modality is scanty in the literature. These issues provide the 
core questions for this thesis.  
 29 
 
Chapter 3 The Context of Aid and Local Polity  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research context of aid and local polity involvement in Tanzania. 
The chapter presents the historical background to aid and policy-making. Aid and policy 
processes, outcomes, and key major players are described. The current circumstances of aid 
and policy-making at district-level are also presented.  Finally, the research gap, focusing on 
the national and district level is briefly explored. 
 
3.2 Aid and Policy-making in Tanzania 
Soon after independence in 1961, Tanzania declared war against three closely related evils: 
poverty, ignorance, and disease. The newly-elected independent government inherited a 
weak and dependent economy with “no university, less than two hundred university 
graduates, twelve secondary schools and extremely low levels of enrolments in primary 
schools” (Pratt, 1976, p. 93).  It would have been difficult for the government at this point to 
have institutional capacity to formulate policies independent of the previous colonial 
government.  Evidence shows that the post-independence nationalist government started 
with a weak institutional and organisational capacity to define, defend, and develop 
comprehensive long-term development policies, plans, and strategies for the new nation 
(Rugumamu, 1997, pp. 106-107).  Most of the government functionaries were inherited 
from the former colonial government which had little or no commitment to formulating 
national development strategies or policies. 
The new independent government inherited a Three-Year Development Plan (1961-1964) 
prepared by the then departing colonial government. It is suggested that this was one of the 
major ways for Britain to ensure that colonial preferences were continued (Crouch, 1987).  
This plan and subsequent five-year development plans that followed were blueprints for 
developing countries emerging from colonial rule as advised by the World Bank. Three 
World Bank missions to Tanzania are identified as playing a critical role in informing the 
country’s early plans. The first mission that arrived just before independence in 1960 
advised on general economic development with emphasis on agriculture and foreign 
investment. The second mission, known as the Arthur D. Little team, advised on industrial 
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development in 1961, and the third was the Ross mission in 1965 which advised on 
implementation procedure of the First Five-Year Development Plan (Rugumamu, 1997, pp. 
111-112).  Clearly, foreign aid has had a long history of influence in policy-making and 
implementation. The huge influence of the World Bank in these early years shows that, right 
from the beginning, the recipient government had little to contribute in development 
policy-making and implementation processes.  
It was not until later that extensive programmes related to poverty eradication were 
initiated, including programmes to expand education, health services, and water supply as 
well as improvement of physical infrastructure and development of agriculture and the 
economy as a whole (URT, 1998). Up to this point, Tanzania had no clear national 
development policy apart from the first guiding five-year national development plans of 
1964-69.  Five-year plans were expected to be funded by foreign aid and foreign and local 
private investments to bring growth and development.  When the expected foreign 
assistance did not materialise, the Arusha Declaration was planned as the response 
(Wangwe, 1997). In 1967, the Arusha Declaration established a development ideology as the 
first development policy. The Arusha Declaration fostered Socialism and Self-Reliance Policy. 
The major objective of this policy was to build an egalitarian, self-reliant, socialist economy.  
This type of socialism, spearheaded by the first president Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and 
known as “Ujamaa” or “family-hood”, was inspired by traditions of African solidarity and 
Christianity rather than Marxism (Calderisi, 2007, p. 115). Among other things, the Arusha 
Declaration placed heavy emphasis on agriculture and use of available labour (TANU, 1967). 
The Declaration and subsequent government policies tried to reduce dependence on foreign 
aid and instead foster self-reliance in Tanzania society.  Self-reliance put heavy emphasis on 
building the capacity of human resources through education and state capacity. 
Self-reliance, as used in the Declaration slogan, meant mainly control of the economy, 
absence of classes, willingness to exist without foreign aid, and decentralisation which 
implied each village used local techniques and materials and minimised dependence on 
central government (Coulson, 1982, p. 299). Efforts to achieve economic independence 
were summarised by the then ruling party statement: 
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How can we depend on foreign governments and companies for a major part 
of our development without giving those governments and companies a great 
part of our freedom to act as we please? The truth is that we cannot. (TANU, 
1967, p. 14) 
The government’s early plans after independence drew upon the assumption that 
substantial foreign assistance would be forthcoming, particularly from Britain, and later 
weaned.  This did not happen because Tanzania’s relations with its then major donors –  
Britain, USA, and West Germany – deteriorated in the 1960s over political issues such as 
Britain’s endorsing the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of white-ruled Rhodesia 
(formerly Zimbabwe), the USA’s role in civil war in Congo, and West Germany opposition to 
the East Germany embassy in Zanzibar (Pratt, 1976, pp. 139-152).  However many donors 
got involved in Tanzania after independence and through the early 1980s to a point where 
literature calls Tanzania a kind of laboratory or testing ground for various forms of state 
involvement (Calderisi, 2007, p. 104; Coulson, 1982, p. 316).   
Aid and development policies during the era of the Arusha Declaration rested on two central 
pillars of the declaration: socialism and self-reliance. The Arusha Declaration was an attempt 
by the Tanzanian leadership to “redefine a distinct national development trajectory after 
the disillusionment of the first five years of independence” (Rugumamu, 1997, p. 122). The 
Arusha Declaration defined the context of international cooperation, aiming to limit and 
control external and internal exploitation, control the state bureaucracy, emphasise self-
reliance and basic needs through the new education system, and finally, spearhead 
cooperation with other African and developing countries. This was almost the first attempt 
to pin down a national development policy with some conditions for receiving or rejecting 
foreign assistance. In practice this policy had little success. Surprisingly, the socialist policies 
of Tanzania attracted huge quantities of foreign assistance from both capitalist and socialist 
countries.  Some argue that donors of different ideological perspectives were attracted by 
Nyerere and his ‘Leadership Code’ ” (Rugumamu, 1997, p. 140). The role of the President is 
said to have played an important part to the point of being equalled to “an economic asset” 
(Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 229). Some called it “Tanzaphilia” or more elaborately 
“uncritical intellectual fascination with the novel development experiments in Tanzania” 
(Mazrui, 1969, p. 255).   
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However, relationships between Tanzania and its aid donors were not smooth. It is known 
that in the early 1980s relationships between Tanzania and the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) were under strain. The IFIs started to question Tanzania’s basic economic 
policy framework, pointing out that domestic policies – mainly Socialism and Self-Reliance – 
and economic mismanagement were the main causes of economic crisis.   This delayed a 
Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) agreement until 1986. In the era of Structural 
Adjustment Policies Tanzania, like many developing countries, was passing through a 
difficult period, hence only a few donors were assisting. Tanzania resisted International 
Monetary Fund IMF and World Bank influence in economic reform proposals until 1986 
when finally economic reform was agreed (Barkan, 2009, p. 83).  The SAP’s implementation 
however dragged on for ten years and nearly overlapped with Poverty Reduction Papers 
PRSPs (Joseph & Gillies, 2009). Nyerere was said to be opposed to the IMF Economic 
Recovery Programs (ERP) until his retirement in 1985, before the first phase ERP was 
implemented in 1986-1989. The reforms did not succeed because the government retained 
scepticism and resistance to the reforms up to the 1990s (Bigsten & Danielson, 2001). The 
reason could be that Tanzania was still getting huge amounts of almost unaccounted-for aid 
from the Nordic countries.  Aid modality during this time was mainly balance-of-payments 
and projects.  However, by 1985 the Nordic countries urged Tanzania to accept and adopt 
the IMF economic policy reforms (Wangwe, 1998). When Tanzania accepted the IFIs 
proposed SAPs reforms in 1986, aid flows resumed but under policy reform conditionality.  
It is asserted that the relationship had changed from one in which Tanzania owned its 
policies in the 1970s to one in which the policy agenda was donor-driven, especially by the 
IFIs with full support of other donors (Wangwe, 2002). 
Under a new government, headed by President Mwinyi, the relationship between Tanzania 
and its aid donors became sour again in the mid-1990s. A World Bank report identified 
scandals involving corruption related to non-collection of customs duties linked to senior 
Ministry of Finance Officials in the late 1994. Norway, a long term donor which once 
Nyerere called “Tanzania’s all-weather friends”, reacted by stopping balance-of-payments 
support (Selbervik, 2006a, p. 1).  At the same time, evaluation of other Nordic countries’ aid 
programmes and projects in Tanzania showed that the level of aid effectiveness had fallen 
below expectations (Wangwe, 1998).  In order to mend relationships, the Danish Embassy, 
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in consultation with the government of Tanzania, sought experts’ advice by forming a 
taskforce which identified major problems. In the experts’ report, donors perceived budget 
mismanagement, inefficient administration, and corruption: on the other side, the 
government of Tanzania criticised donors for making onerous and unrealistic demands and 
interfering excessively in policy reform process with little effort to fulfil promises made 
(Helleiner, Killick, Lipumba , Ndullu, & Svendsen, 1995).  This report made one strong point – 
ownership of projects, programmes, and policies had been eroded considerably (Wangwe, 
2002).  The Helleiner report proposed 21 recommendations. Three points were crucial: First 
the parties were urged to encourage country ownership and government leadership of 
development policy including having a development vision. Secondly, donors needed to be 
coordinated and channel their resources through government systems by pooling resources. 
Thirdly, engagement of non-state actors in policy discussions, especially civil society, was 
called for (Helleiner, et al., 1995).  
The Helleiner report triggered a meeting between the government and donors which 
resulted in the adoption of the recommendations into “Agreed Notes” of the 18 actions to 
improve their relationships (URT, 2006). The new government under President Mkapa was 
committed to implement these agreed reforms.  The government of Tanzania, with the 
assistance of the World Bank, started a revenue collection agency semi-independent from 
the Ministry of Finance to curb tax evasion and corruption. Other major outcomes in 
implementing the recommendations of the Helleiner Report were the formulation of 
Tanzania Vision 2025 and the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) (URT, 1998).  
Although these plans were downplayed in the later development of policy-making processes 
by aid donors, both the vision and the strategy are still mentioned in the later development 
strategy documents. Another major outcome of the Helleiner Report was the establishment 
of Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) in 2002 which served as the medium-term framework 
for development cooperation with aims to strengthen coordination, harmonisation, 
alignment, and national ownership. TAS later became the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAST) in 
2006 to include more  stakeholders and working frameworks based on the Paris Declaration 
of Aid Effectiveness (URT, 2006).  Under JAST arrangements budget support has replaced 
project support as the preferred aid modality (Figure 3.1), although the majority of aid 
provided in Tanzania is still in form of project aid and basket funding.  
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Figure 3.1 Government preferred aid modality 
Source:  United Republic of Tanzania (2006) 
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Almost all aid delivered now is under the Sector Wide Approaches arrangement whereby 
donors try to use local systems and government institutions. 
Tanzania was one of the first few countries enlisted on the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative of the IFIs. In late 1999 Tanzania was required to prepare the first Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRS).   Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were pre-requisites for poor 
countries to access soft loans and debt relief.  Although both the National Poverty 
Eradication Strategy (NPES) and Vision 2025 were downplayed by the IFIs in the beginning, 
these documents had significant input into the first Tanzanian PRSP.  The PRSP was 
supposed to be country-owned in terms of involving a broad range of local stakeholders. 
However, the first Tanzanian PRSP was quickly produced and did not have the desired level 
of consultation and participation of stakeholders (Hakikazi, 2002, p. 1).  The main 
shortcomings of the first PRSP consultations are well recorded by one study (Gould & 
Ojanen, 2003).  These consultations mainly involved a small group of donors and 
government technocrats in a consensual partnership. However, the informed and 
professional input from the main civil society advocacy coalition, Tanzania Coalition on Debt 
and Development (TCDD), was sidelined because the network brought up issues that were 
not agreed to by the donor-state consensus. Also consultations of upcountry rural 
constituencies were ignored.  Another criticism is that this PRSP was not country-owned 
because it was done in haste to meet IFIs HIPC debt relief conditionality and had more 
donor influence than local actor influence (Wohlgemuth, 2006, p. 6). However, the most 
important contribution this process had was an opened space for policy dialogue, especially 
between donors and state officials, sometimes including civil society.  
The first generation PRSP goals and outcomes localised or linked targets to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and targets.  The first five years of implementation of PRSPs, 
especially in the education sector, recorded preliminary success. Aid was officially 
institutionalised from global to national and local level, assuming that these entities are 
uniform.  PRS was crucial in Tanzania resulting in strong links between ministry plans and 
priorities, budgets, and Poverty Reduction Strategy broad goals. 
In 2005 the second-generation Poverty Reduction Strategy was launched under the name of 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). NSGRP was developed with 
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a broad consultation with national stakeholders and donors. NSGRP was said to be 
outcome-based and comprehensive covering a five-year period, 2005-2010, with three 
major clusters of outcomes of poverty reduction: (1) growth and reduction of income 
poverty, (2) improved quality of life and social well being, and (3) good governance and 
accountability (URT, 2005a). The new PRSP (fourth-generation) has just been approved 
covering the five-year period 2010-2015. 
The second-generation PRSP was not very successful despite its comprehensive planning, 
wide consultation, and promoting pro-poor growth. The failure of NSRP or MKUKUTA (in 
Kiswahili) was attributed to formulation process. Concerns were raised about limited 
political input and weak budget linkage.  One study found that NSGRP and the incumbent 
political party manifesto were pointing in the same direction, but with some fundamental 
differences – for instance giving broad outcomes and issues different weights (Selbervik, 
2006b, pp. 19-20).  Similarities and differences of the national strategy and the political 
manifesto imply  that the National Executive Council of the ruling party, CCM, had consulted 
NSGRP in the process of preparing the manifesto but participants in MKUKUTA preparation 
had little political party guidance (Rweyemamu, 2009, p. 12). This supports arguments  that 
it is typical in Tanzanian policy-making there is little or no explicit political inputs into the 
major documents and strategies (Therkildsen, 2009). The second reason attributed to the 
failure of NSGRP is its  weak linkage to the budget especially Medium Term Expenditure 
Frameworks (MTEFs) (Rweyemamu, 2009, p. 17). 
The significant contribution of the budget support was to open up policy engagement space. 
Also, donors increasingly use the government exchequer system to deliver aid. However, 
policy implementation is still contested, there is a lot going on in policy-making but quite 
few linkages to daily implementation of development initiatives.  
Ideally changing aid modality was expected to involve the central government with non 
state actors such as civil society and the private sector, and donors. At the district level, the 
local government authorities and district civil society were expected to be involved.  
However the historical public policy planning that has been practiced in Tanzania does not 
seem to be happening at district level. This has led to poor implementation of development 
initiatives and a sense of dissatisfaction, declining participation and sometimes resistance 
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from communities.  There are underreported  examples of protest and resistance against 
local level extortion and corruption (Cooksey & Kikula, 2005). Further research shows that 
the current aid environment can both be empowering and marginalizing the poor (Brehony 
& Kinsella, 2009). 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the background to the relationship between aid and policy-
making in Tanzania since independence.  In the early years after independence the country 
was aid dependent with weak policy planning and implementation institutions. In the 1970s 
local policy making capacity was strong even when aid dependency was high. The ideology 
of Socialism and Self-Reliance were strongly influential in leading development plans. 
However, from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s the government lost leadership on 
development planning and policy-making and implementation became donor-driven.  
Relationships between donors and the government of Tanzania deteriorated from trust to 
strife. In the late 1990s, efforts were made to improve the aid environment. The 2000s saw 
the era of policy engagement involving multiple stakeholders, having a tangible national 
development strategy, and a development vision. 
The global aid structure as implemented at national policy-making at national level rarely 
considered institutional impact for state and non state actors.  There are institutions that 
have been strengthened or weakened. This is even prevalent at district level where linkage 
with national level actors is not well explained by aid structure. This raises the research 
question where is the local in all these institutional engagements? 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to present and justify the methodology and epistemology 
used in this study to answer research questions.  First, the chapter introduces the research 
epistemology. A constructivist and participatory approach which acknowledges a variety of 
worldviews was used. Participants’ perceptions and experiences are respected, recognised, 
and captured via in-depth interviews and documentary analysis.  Next, the research design 
is presented. The research design describes methods used; this includes both primary and 
secondary data sources and the process by which interviewees were recruited. Methods of 
data collection, and the organisation and analysis of information are also described.  The 
chapter concludes by describing ethical consideration and researcher positionality. 
 
4.2 Research Epistemology: Constructivist and Participatory Worldviews 
This study design employed a qualitative research approach. The qualitative approach in 
theory is based on phenomenology. Firstly, the approach is constructivist, meaning the 
“researcher seeks to establish the meaning of a phenomenon from the views of participants” 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 16). Second, the approach is participatory; individuals’ stories, 
experiences, and perceptions about a process or an issue are recorded when the researcher 
engages the participants in open-ended interviews, and by researcher observations among 
other methods. According to Creswell (2009, p. 18), “individuals are interviewed at some 
length to determine how they have personally experienced” an issue.  This approach is quite 
different from a positivist worldview which allows for a single, objective, reality that can be 
observed and or measured.  In the constructivist participatory worldview, the world is a 
function of personal interactions and perceptions which are subject to interpretation 
(Dowling, 2005, p. 25).  
This study employed qualitative methods of data collection.  Qualitative research is 
fundamentally interpretive (Creswell, 2009, p. 16). Open interpretation usually involves both 
the researcher and participants in the study. Therefore researcher observations were 
included in data collection. 
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A qualitative approach was selected as the most suitable method for this study because of 
the ability of participatory approaches to capture people’s perceptions about actors, 
processes, and outcomes. 
This study was based on a case study of two districts.  A case study is “not a methodological 
choice but a choice of what is to be studied” (Patton, 2002, p. 447). In this instance the fact 
that district decision-making processes and policy implementation are mostly homogenous 
determined the choice of the two districts out of 133 districts in the Tanzania mainland. 
The choice of rural and urban districts was made to capture any spatial and or resource 
allocation differences on the subject of development policy implementation.  
Decentralisation by devolution gave more autonomy to local governments in political, fiscal, 
and administrative control over resources.   Noticeably, differences might exist in terms of 
access to resources between urban and rural district settings. Also, community participation 
and individuals’ perceptions of policy interventions might differ between urban and rural 
contexts. 
 
4.3 Research Design 
Research questions and objectives determined the research design. The qualitative 
paradigm was considered as most effective to establish whether changing aid modality has 
had any impact to local decision-making processes, policy-making and responses. To do this, 
it was important to recognise the roles of different actors.  Because this study was designed 
to capture perceptions and experiences it was crucial to use a qualitative research design 
whereby in-depth interviews with people directly involved in policy-making and 
implementation both at national and district level were conducted.  Relevant documents 
including published or unpublished reports provided important supplementary information 
for answering the research questions.  
 
4.3.1 Qualitative methods 
Qualitative methods, especially semi-structured interviews with key informants, are 
particularly suited for the type of information that is being sought. This study involved 
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questioning the ways in which changing aid modality has had any impact on local 
development prioritisation and implementation. Questions raised issues of the role of actors 
and subsequent processes in decision-making and implementation.  The extent that the 
district council has autonomy was explored in addition to its relationship with the line 
ministries and how national priorities are localised or local plans are linked to national 
priorities, especially where foreign aid in budget support is involved.  
 
4.3.2 Semi-structured and key informant interviews 
Qualitative research design provides the basis for key informant interviews.  This study 
design used semi-structured dialogue and key informant individual interviews.  Contentious 
and important issues about changing aid modality and local actors’ relationships were 
discussed.  Interviews targeted issues related to the role of the research participants and 
their personal and organization experiences. A list of interviewees was identified during 
study design.  Changes to relevant interviewees were made as information gaps unfolded.  
Interviews with each participant took one to two hours in a secure location. In some 
instance, follow-up interviews were done to address information gaps and for further 
clarification of issues.  An interview guide was used for questions.  Questions relevant to the 
particular participant were asked. Not all questions were asked to every participant. Follow-
up questions not in interview guide were asked especially when extra information was 
sought.  Follow-up questions were also asked when research participants were willing to 
give in-depth information.  The dialogue among participants and between participants and 
the interviewer revolved around research questions and questions in the interview guide. 
Qualitative research design provides the basis for key informant and group interviews.  
Contentious and important issues about changing aid modality and local actors’ 
relationships were discussed.  Interviews targeted issues related to the role of the research 
participants and their personal and organization experiences.  
 
4.3.3 Documentary review 
This research design used documentary review as a complimentary method of data 
collection and analysis.  Documents of relevance from particular offices were identified and 
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used. These included published reports and other “grey literature” in the form of internal 
reports.  District annual plans and reports were also used and National development policy 
documents contributed to this process. Likewise, reports from development partners and 
civil society were included. 
 
4.3.4 Primary and Secondary Data Sources 
This study used both primary and secondary data sources. First, the study areas were 
identified and selected. Second, primary data sources consisting of individual interviewees 
were identified and selected for data collection. Finally, secondary data in forms of reports 
was collected.  
 
 The study area 
The research locations were purposefully selected based on convenience of reaching the 
areas without delay, cost effectiveness, and the researcher’s familiarity with them.  The 
study in question could have been undertaken in any district in Tanzania because of the 
uniformity of local government authorities. There are 133 local government authorities in 
Tanzania and this number is expected to increase after new regions were added recently. 
However, for this study rural-urban differences were taken into account with data being 
collected from one urban and one rural location. Arusha is an urban district with a municipal 
status. Arusha Municipal is one of the five districts of the Arusha region. Arusha Municipality 
is divided into three divisions: Themi, Elerai, and Suye.   These divisions are further sub-
divided into seventeen wards, namely; Kati, Sekei, Themi, Kaloleni, Levolosi, Ngarenaro, 
Unga Limited, Daraja Mbili, Baraa, Sokoni Ӏ, Elerai, Kimandolu, Oloirien, Sombetini, Terrat, 
Engutoto and Lemara. Most of these wards are in an urban setting and their primary unit of 
governance is the street (or Mtaa in Kiswahili). The rural wards (especially Terrat and some 
parts of Engutoto) have a total of ten villages.  According to the Arusha Municipal Council 
website, these villages are under consideration for removal (AMC, 2010). The Arusha 
Municipal population is estimated at 359,004. It is said to have the highest population 
density in Tanzania with 3,040 people per square kilometre (AMC, 2010).  Tourism business 
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opportunities and the Tanzanite gemstones business are said to be the major reasons for 
the high population density in Arusha (AMC, 2010).  
Kongwa is one of five districts of Dodoma region, a political capital of Tanzania.  Kongwa has 
a district council status. Administratively, Kongwa district is divided into 14 wards namely; 
Chamkoroma, Kibaigwa, Hogoro, Iduo, Kongwa, Mkoka, Mlali, Mtanana, Njoge, Pandambili, 
Sagara, Sejeli, Ugogoni and Zoissa. Rural wards are comprised of 66 villages. Kongwa has a 
population of 248,656 according to 2002 National Population and Housing Census.   
The Kongwa area is known for the failed Colonial Groundnuts Scheme. The Groundnut 
Scheme was set up by the British government in 1948 under the control of the then 
Overseas Food Corporation to supply the UK with much needed vegetable oil for domestic 
use (Hogendorn & Scott, 1981).   Apart from the local villagers, Kongwa Township was built 
to accommodate staff needed for the groundnuts project.  After the colonial project staff 
left in 1958, Kongwa remained a local township. However, in the 1960s Kongwa was used as 
a military base for the South African National Congress party (ANC) military members who 
had undergone training in the then Soviet Union, Algeria, Egypt, and China (Ivey, 2008). 
Characteristically, Kongwa is a semi-arid area with the majority of its inhabitants’ main 
livelihoods depending on farming and livestock keeping. The locations selected for the data 
collection were Arusha Municipal Council (urban) and Kongwa District Council (rural). This 
involved district council staff and legislators. At community level this study involved 
participants from Njiro primary school (Arusha-urban) and Kongwa primary school (Kongwa-
rural). 
 
 Primary Data Sources and Identification of Study Participants 
Selection of the study participants was purposeful. In the planning phase, all district 
department heads were included in the sample; however, during the field exercise only a 
few district heads of departments working directly with the education sector were chosen. 
A letter asking to conduct research in the particular district and outlining the topic and 
research objectives was sent to the regional administrative secretaries of both Arusha and 
Dodoma.  The Regional Administrative Secretaries gave a copy of the research permit 
(appendix 1) to District Administrative Secretaries in both districts. The District 
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Administrative Secretaries wrote letters to District Executive Director who allowed district 
council staff to be interviewed. In Kongwa, the letter from the District Administrative 
Secretary described the interviewees the researcher wanted to talk to including civil society 
organisations. Interviewees selected were: District Education Officer (primary and 
secondary), District Community Development Officer(s), Finance and Revenue Officer(s), 
District Treasurer and District Planning Officer(s). Generally, in both districts people in the 
same positions were interviewed: however, while the District Education Officer (secondary 
education) in Arusha was interviewed, this did not happen in Kongwa because the Arusha 
experience showed it was important to focus in primary education.  
Study participants at the national level were selected from the researcher’s previous 
acquaintances and prior email communication. For instance, donor agencies were emailed 
from contacts listed on the missions’ websites. Preliminary work was done to identify 
institutions involved in the basic education sector.   
 
Secondary data sources 
Various written resources proved to be useful sources of secondary data. Reports and 
booklets at district level were important in this regard. Documents reviewed included 
district budget books – those of the 2009/10 fiscal year, especially, were used to generate 
information relevant for this study. Reports and documents at district council level – such as 
planning guidelines, procedures, and reports –   were reviewed. Reports and other relevant 
documents from civil society at district level, such as one Public Expenditure Tracking Study, 
were also used to enrich this study.  
Donor and central government internal unpublished reports were used to capture the 
formality of interaction between and among actors at national level. CSO’s unpublished 
reports and research reports were important to capture alternative views of aid and policy-
making and implementation in Tanzania.  CSO’s umbrella networks websites, especially the 
Policy Forum site, provided a crucial link to these documents. 
National level documents reviewed were policy documents such as National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (URT, 2005a), Vision 2025 and National Poverty 
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Eradication Strategy (URT, 1998). Aid-related documents from both the government and 
Development Partners, such as Joint Assistance Strategy, were reviewed.  Documents such 
as Poverty and Human Development Reports published by the National Bureau of Statistics 
in collaboration with local research institutions provided some information in this research. 
Also Tanzania’s fiscal year 2010/11 recent budget speech and briefs contributed greatly in 
this study.  
Documents of interest about Local Government Authorities in Tanzania were sought and 
used to enrich understanding on development decision-making processes and 
implementation.  Comparisons between documents were made to cross-check and enrich 
the information obtained. It is important to connect the development strategies in key 
development policies, local level plans, and their relevance in decision-making and 
implementation. 
 
Sampling and Research Participants Selection 
In an effort to narrow down the study design to education sector development priorities, 
few heads of departments were interviewed. Only departments related directly to the basic 
education sector were involved. Key informant in-depth interviews were conducted among 
Central and Local Government employees at the district level. Central government 
interviewees were one Municipal Director and one District Executive Director. Both district 
directors were men. Local government employees interviewed were two District Planning 
Officers (men), four District Community Development Officers (one was a woman), five 
District Education Officers (four primary, one secondary, and one statistics). One District 
Education Officer was a woman. Also, two District Revenue and Finance heads of 
departments (treasurers) were interviewed. Both were men. Local elected representatives 
interviewed included two Members of Parliament and two councillors (all men). The study 
interviewed four civil society representatives at district level involved with district level 
policy advocacy and service delivery (represented by men).  Some of the civil society 
organisations are involved with national level policy engagement.  One of the civil society 
organisations was serving as secretariat of a regional umbrella of civil society network. 
Another served as a secretariat of regional education civil society network.  One of the civil 
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society organisations working on service delivery was an international NGO. All of the civil 
society organisations spoken to had worked or were still working with the local government 
or central government at various levels of either just consultation, using government 
employees for expertise, or policy advocacy.   Most of the civil society organisations working 
at district level deliver some kind of service, especially in the basic education sector.   
In order to determine the changing roles of local actors at community level, a school 
committee was used as a unit of discussion in which three representatives were interviewed 
including two head teachers (both women) and one former committee chairman. 
At national level, interviews were held with two government officials from the Ministries of 
Education and Finance (both men), three development partners (one woman), and one civil 
society representative working at national level (a man).  One public policy consultant (a 
woman) with in-depth experience in the education sector was also interviewed. Table 4.1 
outlines the number and sex of research participants at both national and district level. 
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Table 4.1 Study Participants 
Designation Arusha Municipal 
Council 
Kongwa District 
Council 
National Total 
 M F M F M F 
District Executive Director
1
 1  1    2 
District Education Officer
2
 1 1 3    5 
District Planning Officer
3
 1  1    2 
District Treasury/Revenue Officer
4
 1  1    2 
District Community Development 
Officer
5
 
1  2 1   4 
Member of Parliament
6
 1  1    2 
Ward Councillor
7
 1  1    2 
Head Teacher
8
  1  1   2 
Committee Chairperson
9
   1    1 
Civil Society
10
 2  2  1  5 
Ministry Official
11
     1 1 2 
Development Partners (KII, DP 1-3
12
     2 1 3 
Consultant
13
      1 1 
Total       33 
 
                                                          
1
 Key Informant Interviews with District Executive Directors coded as LGA 1 and 2 
2
 Key Informant Interviews with District Education Officers coded as LGA 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
3
 Key Informant Interviews with District Planning Officers coded as LGA 8 and 9 
4
 Key Informant Interviews with District Revenue Officers coded as LGA 10 and 11 
5
 Key Informant Interviews with District Community Development Officers coded LGA 12, 13, 14 and 15 
6
 Key Informant Interviews with Members of Parliament coded as LGA 16 and 17 
7
 Key Informant Interviews with Ward Councillors coded as LGA 18 and 19 
8
 Key Informant Interviews with Head Teachers coded as SC 1 and 2 
9
 Key Informant Interviews with Committee chairperson coded as SC 3 
10
 Key Informant Interviews with Civil Society representatives coded as CSO 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
11
 Key Informant Interviews with Ministry Officials, finance (MoFEA) and education (MOEVT) 
12
 Key Informant Interviews with donor three representatives coded as DP 1 to 3 
13
 Key Informant Interviews with a Consultant coded as CSO 6 
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4.4 Data Collection 
An interview guide in the form of an open ended questionnaire was developed (appendix 2).  
The guide contained general questions that were contextualized into specific questions in 
the research process. Each participant was asked a different set of follow-up questions. In 
total, 33 participants were interviewed, face-to-face, at both national and district levels. Due 
to time constraints one interview was conducted on Skype.  Most of these interviews took 
between one and two hours and in a few cases follow-up interviews were held the next day 
or when time and necessary information was available.  Some interviews were very short: 
the heavy workload of participants resulted into limited time to talk for one hour – for 
instance, Members of Parliament, District Executive Directors, and Ministry of Education 
Staff.  Out of the 42 appointments for interviews that were made some interview 
engagements were cancelled due to limited time on the part of participants resulting in a 
final total of 33.  During the interview process notes were handwritten on a notebook to be 
transcribed later.  
Data collection also involved gathering of relevant reports such as research report, progress 
reports, and organisation charts.   Photocopies or soft copies of some of these reports were 
stored when necessary. Some reports were read on-site or borrowed for few days given 
consent of the custodians. 
 
4.5 Data Analysis 
Information collected in this study was mostly qualitative with few figures and numerical 
data in reports.  Qualitative data analysis was done right from the field during data 
collection. However the main exercise of data analysis was done after the field work when a 
thematic approach was used to sift information in key themes according to critical issues 
raised in the field.  Research notes were transcribed after the completion of interviews and 
documentary reviews. Transcribed interviews notes were coded and summary of findings 
were organised in similar themes according to the research objectives. Themes that 
emerged out of coded notes provided a good basis of research findings and discussion.  The 
organization of data took a two-fold approach, first the role of each main actor in 
development policy-making and implementation was outlined. Key issues emerged as the 
role of actors were drawn upon.  Links were mapped to establish relationships between and 
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within actors. Second as the roles of actors unfolded, processes and outcomes of actors’ 
interaction produced issues which were later categorized into themes based on research 
objectives.  Findings and discussion were presented and discussed in both diagrammatical 
and textual.  Data presentation and discussion went hand-in-hand to ensure information 
flow and link to research questions. 
 
4.6 Ethical Considerations 
This study upheld ethical considerations as outlined in the Victoria University of Wellington 
Ethical policy. Ethics approval for this study was granted (appendix 3).  Research Consent 
forms and a thorough explanation of research objectives were used to let respondents 
decide if they wanted to participate or not.  In the field, before the data collection exercise 
started, a research permit was required in both districts. Given that the districts were in 
different regions, two research permits had to be sought (appendix 1). The granting of these 
permits increased confidence among participants. Confidentiality of information provided 
by interviewees was assured by coding their responses.   Some participants agreed to be 
quoted but, for consistency, this research report will only use participants’ coded names.  
 
4.7 Positionality 
In any research bias may arise due to the researcher’s positionality.  My personal 
experiences as a researcher determines the construction, reception, and use of knowledge 
gained in this research exercise. Positionality or multiple positionalities have influence on 
knowledge and understandings of ethical practices in a participatory mindset (Hopkins, 
2007). This requires researchers to recognise our own positionalities; how various identities 
may influence and shape our research activities.  
 My ethnicity, and ‘insider’ status, may have almost no influence on local actors that I talked 
to, due to the fact that all of them were Tanzanians. However, for issues regarding the 
relationship between development partners and the government, my ethnicity may well 
have been an advantage with government people talking about issues that they would not 
tell a foreigner. On the other hand, with regard to development partners I may have missed 
being told sensitive information because of being regarded as a Tanzanian.  
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Being a male, educated person may have affected the outcome of this research especially 
with issues concerning women. It should be noted, however, that there were very few 
female interviewees as there are few females in various positions at district and national 
level in the government, civil society and development partners 
Additionally, while my prior work with NGOs (local and international) opened up 
opportunities of contacts and acquaintances, my positionality in this sense may have denied 
me the self-critical lens towards civil society organisations. Furthermore, my civil society 
organisation positionality may have influenced the way I looked at other actors, too, such as 
the government and development partners.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined how this study was conducted and the reasons for selecting this 
approach. The study was based on qualitative epistemology with a strong focus on 
participatory worldview. In-depth interviews were conducted with a selected group of 
interviewees at district and national level. Participants came from the central government, 
local government, local and international civil society, development partners, and school 
committee representatives (community). Secondary data was also used to enhance findings 
from interviews. Data analysis provided a basis of two major categories: the role of various 
actors, and processes and outcomes of policy-making. Ethical considerations and the 
positionality of the researcher were considered briefly. 
  
 50 
 
Chapter 5 Changing Aid Modality – the Roles of Different Actors 
5.1 Introduction 
Changing aid modalities from programmes or projects to General Budget Support (GBS) has 
affected key actors differently.  The role of the central government has changed most 
fundamentally. This changed role of the central government has affected CSOs, Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs), communities, and to some extent even Development 
Partners (DPs). 
This chapter aims to explore how the role of the central government has changed and how 
different agencies have been affected. First in this chapter, a brief overview of actors in the 
era of project support is presented. Second, the key issues – as explained by field research 
participants – about the role of the central government and how it has changed in light of 
the new aid modality are identified. Third, the ways in which the changed role of the central 
government has affected different actors and local communities is discussed. 
  
5.2 Actors’ Changing Roles  
In Tanzania in the early 1960s most aid was in project and programme form, and focussed 
on supporting projects within the government structure through central ministries, 
departments and agencies, district departments, and NGOs. Donors funded both 
international and national NGOs.  A particular district department would directly deliver aid 
in the form of services. Likewise, international and national NGOs aimed aid to impact 
beneficiary communities.  Relationships between donors and the Government of Tanzania 
were generally good. According to the Helleiner Report, during “the thirty-year-old aid 
relationships, many donors were enthusiastic about the equity-oriented and socialistic 
aspirations of the government and the then president Julius Nyerere” (Helleiner, et al., 1995, 
p. 6). However, this relationship reached a crisis in the 1990s. Following a more neoliberal 
approach which was suspicious of a large central government role, the local government 
became more important to donors. It was also a time when NGOs proliferated.  At the same 
time, central government agencies faced the challenge of a multitude of uncoordinated 
donor-funded projects. More than 2,000 projects with about 40 donors were involved 
(Helleiner, et al., 1995, p. 40). The government had no authority or power to coordinate 
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these activities. The government was more like a loose network of ministries, departments, 
and agencies, acting incoherently.  Figure 5.1 describes these main actors and the roles they 
played in aid delivery in Tanzania.  During this time donors did not act in unison although 
there was a loose network of like-minded donors such as the Nordic countries group. There 
were many donors supporting projects at national level through various channels including 
central government agencies and NGOs. These would later support district departments, 
district-level NGOs, and, many times, directly support beneficiary communities.  Also, 
donors financed projects directly to district departments or district-based NGOs. Likewise, 
international NGOs supported beneficiaries directly or through national NGOs and district 
departments. This structure was complicated and the national government had no control 
of what was going on sometimes, even within its ministries.   
Figure 5.1 Actors, Roles and Aid flows in Project Support (1980s-1990s) 
 
Source: Field Research 2010 
 
In the neoliberal era structural changes were advised by international aid regimes. These 
changes required a less government and more market oriented service delivery. The 
structural changes involved reduction in the numbers of public servants in many sectors 
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including service sectors such as education.   Civil society organisations proliferated taking 
the role of service delivery and advocacy.  Local Government Authorities gained strength as 
individual district departments made decisions with and for communities about 
development implementation. The government at national level dealt with a multitude of 
donors and projects using various systems. Relatively speaking, at this time the central 
government capacity depended very much on support from local government.  The dialogue 
and engagement was more between donors and local government authorities (KII, DP3).   
The impact of neoliberal structural changes to service delivery in Tanzania was mainly 
negative. The government reduced spending on the education sector leading to a sharp 
decline in enrolment as a result of the abolishing of free services and the re-introduction of 
user fees such as school fees and other contributions. Also parents’ incomes decreased 
making education provision and even contributions harder.  Enrolment rates declined at the 
same time that public sector employment declined by 15% (Vavrus, 2005, pp. 183-184). 
At the school committee level, parents had more authority about running the schools. 
People’s authority was influenced by the Education for Self-Reliance philosophy under 
ujamaa principles. Everyone felt responsible and parents paid fees so schools were more 
accountable to communities. However, the fees were not sufficient to cover costs of 
running schools so the government and aid agencies subsidised the difference through 
projects where possible.   
 
5.3 The role of Central Government and implications on other actors in Budget Support  
The changes in the aid industry in development policy-making and implementation have 
definitely affected actors in various ways.  Changing aid modality from a focus on 
project/programmes to budget support has caused various responses and implications in 
policy-making and especially implementation. It should be noted that not all Official 
Development Assistance that the government of Tanzania is receiving is in the form of 
General Budget Support (GBS).  Project and basket funds are still provided by donors.  
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) are common to provide funding between projects and 
general budget support. SWAps support sector budgets where donors earmark funds to 
specific activities. 
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Table 5.1 indicates the proportion of aid flows from the three different modalities – General 
budget support (GBS), project, and basket funds – from 2002/03 to 2009/10 fiscal years. 
Only once in this particular period, in the fiscal year 2006/07, was project support below 
GBS. Even then, if projects were combined with basket funds still general budget support 
was lower.  
 
Table 5.1 Aid Composition as Percentage of Total Aid Recorded in the National Budget 
Year 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
GBS 30 38 34 38 42 38 36 38 
Basket 16 18 21 20 16 12 18 18 
Project 54 44 45 42 41 51 46 44 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania (2008) 
 
With the changes from project support to general budget support in the late 1990s the role 
of the central government has dramatically changed from the previous aid arrangement 
where the government was more responsible to its citizens and had a significant reporting 
role to donors. Following this, the central government had little or sometimes no control at 
all of foreign aid resources due to direct implementation to beneficiaries by donors though 
technical staff, NGOs, and Local Government Agencies. 
In the new aid modality the central government has increasingly become stronger in terms 
of centralised decision-making and control of policies leaving actors such as local 
government, civil society, and communities with little control.  Despite the fact that policy 
decisions and implementation became more consultative in the beginning of budget 
support as aid modality, increasingly research participants think the trend has changed (KII, 
CSO1). The government has become stronger compared to other actors in the decision-
making and policy-making arena. For example: in 2010 the government decided to change 
primary school key textbooks as there were too many books to be used by teachers. 
However, the way in which the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) 
handled the change was not transparent. Donors and CSOs were not informed about the 
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change and, suddenly, when they were informed it was too late. Some of the text books 
publishers were hit hard by this decision as expected in a market economy.  
“It was a sad incident, it took us backward. It made me rethink some of the belief that the 
system works well but in some cases my influence is limited” (KII-DP1).  
This is a notable display of the central government’s strength and a typical example of how 
the system does not work effectively in a consultative way in the light of the new aid 
modality. The Government felt able to make a decision unilaterally and it was a top-down 
decision indeed. Although the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) 
handpicked about 40 head teachers to help make the choice of books, others were not 
invited to participate.  The selected teachers made their decision and this was taken to the 
ministry’s established technical committee. However, there were no inputs from donors, 
publishers, or CSOs, all of whom might reasonably have been able to participate and help 
make a more informed decision.  The new aid agenda hopes to encourage greater efficiency 
in decision-making, which was perhaps the case here, but this example suggests that the 
effectiveness of the decisions made may be brought into question when participation is 
limited. 
Figure 5.2 shows that budget support has brought in some changes as compared to figure 
5.1. The government is somehow coordinated under the leadership of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA).  Donors, too, as important players, are loosely 
coordinated under Development Partners’ and GBS donor groups. CSOs try to coordinate 
and work as one voice in some issues. Formal CSO networks are said to be hard to maintain.  
Aid flows have changed with fewer projects going directly to LGAs from the DPs. Projects 
can bypass MoFEA in the current setting; however, efforts have been made to document all 
projects’ sector wide approaches (SWAps). Also, most of the funds or reports pass through 
Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMORALG). The 
only thing which some donors still practice at LGA level is aid in the form of technical 
assistance whereby aid agencies station their personnel at district level to build or develop 
capacity of local staff. For example, in Arusha Municipality there are technical specialists 
working with the Finance and Trade Department for capacity building of local revenue 
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collection. It was revealed from interviews at district level that there is no technical 
assistance in Kongwa. 
 
Figure 5.2 Actors, Roles, and Aid flows in General Budget Support (2000s-2010) 
Source: Field work 2010 
 
During budget support, policy engagement structure changed dramatically. In view of the 
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Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA), other thematic ministries, departments, 
and agencies. CSOs were first informally invited but later formally included in national level 
aid dialogue.  LGAs were pushed out in the belief that they are represented by ministries 
and departments. The Government of Tanzania, through MoFEA, is supposed to lead all 
discussions, in the spirit of country ownership.  
In practice, according to interviewees, the central government is said to reduce policy 
engagement with other actors such as donors and civil society organisations. Invitations to 
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to participate at a short notice invitation but others are, in practice, excluded.  According to 
one informant, the patience of civil society is running out and they cannot tolerate any more 
short notice or delayed invitations to meetings. There is an overall feeling of alienation and 
mistrust (KII-CSO1). 
Noticeably, the central government has reduced accepting inputs from other actors on top 
of declining policy engagement. Civil society organisations point to too many Public 
Expenditure Reviews (PER) meetings from which nothing, or very little, is taken on board in 
policy decisions (KII, CSO1). 
Apart from inputs from regular PER and other policy meetings in Dar es Salaam, it was 
learned that even in occasional policy engagement opportunities the central government 
has ignored or altered inputs from the civil society. Recently, for instance, the Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) was reviewing education and training policy. 
This review involved stakeholders’ consultations. Civil society complained of being used in 
the name of participation for what was, in reality, simply ‘tokenism’ in this process (KII, 
CSO2).  Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) organized a workshop for civil society 
organisations’ representatives where the policy draft was discussed and relevant inputs 
documented. However, concerns were raised by the regional representatives in Arusha that 
most, if not all, of their suggestions and recommendations were left out (KII, CSO2). 
However ministry officials pointed out that some of the said suggestions or 
recommendations from Arusha and many other regional civil society organisations and 
networks were weak. They were mostly activities and issues rather than policy strategies (KII, 
MOEVT). 
Donors face similar issues with civil society but to a lesser extent in relation to being 
sidelined in policy engagement processes.  Donors get information about meetings and 
related agenda relatively earlier than civil society. According to participants, civil society 
organisations, in most cases, get phone calls from the Ministry of Education to participate in 
meetings the next day but sometimes without documents and agenda of the meeting. In 
contrast, donors receive invitations with relevant agenda and documents to be discussed. 
However, both donors and civil society feel the sense of being ignored by the central 
government in terms of timelines for invitations and meetings’ agenda (KII, DP2 and CSO1). 
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It is important to notice that the aid industry has had positive influences too in the course of 
development policy-making and implementation. Changing aid modalities from 
project/programme to budget support came with improving revenue collection.  Although 
the central government in Tanzania started reforms in tax administration and collection to 
combat corruption and improve revenue collection, there was significant assistance from 
development partners.  There was also improved financial and performance management 
with fiscal systems, procedures, and guidelines in place.  
The ownership principle, in accordance with the Paris Declaration, is working to some 
degree in Tanzania.  However, in practice the government representatives, especially at 
national level, still feel that there is limited coherence of the national development plans 
which leads to little implementation.  “It used to be like one person is saying this and we all 
do differently, but now it is like many people say the same thing but we all do differently 
still” (KII, MoFEA). For example, the recently phased-out National Development Plan, or the 
second generation PRSP (NSGRP), was participatory in formulation. Consultations were 
done at all levels with civil society, members of the public, academic institutions and 
legislators played a crucial role.  Donors were hands-off compared to the first generation 
PRSP. However, in implementation, government ministries demonstrated a lack of cohesion. 
Both government and donor study participants agree that this was the problem, but 
attribute it largely due to limited linkage between policies and practice in Tanzania (KII, 
MoFEA, and DP2).   
 
5.4 Impacts on Other Actors 
5.4.1 Local Government Authorities  
Decentralization has been at the heart of Tanzania’s policy-making for a long time. However 
the semi-autonomous structure of Local Government Authorities (LGAs) started in 1980s. 
The previous villagisation programme failed, but the later form of LGAs at district level was 
strong and functional. The first phase of LGA reforms was intended to give more power to 
people in decision-making and implementation; however, the opposite happened whereby 
it became more the means to centralise power or de-concentration (Nyimbi, 2008, p. 3). 
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During this time functions and powers of central government were supposed to be 
transferred to district-based central government offices.   
From the 1990s new legal structures of LGAs aimed to facilitate Decentralization by 
Devolution (D-D) in which the central government was to devolve its authority and power to 
elected LGAs.  The central government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) were 
expected to switch from direct implementation to the role of support and monitoring of 
LGAs.  The Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) began officially in 2000 with four 
main objectives 
 Devolution of power to locally elected councils and committees (political 
decentralisation) 
 Collection of taxes and budgeting based on local priorities (financial decentralisation) 
 De-linking local authorities staff from the respective line ministries, making them 
accountable to the local government (administrative decentralisation) 
 Changing the role of line ministries from control to that of policy-making, regulating, 
support and monitoring to ensure quality of services and national standards 
(PMORALG, 1998, pp. 4-5). 
 
Political/administrative Decentralisation 
Research participants pointed out that local government reforms have not adequately 
devolved administrative and political powers to district level: the reforms’ intention was 
good but in practice a lot of power is still vested in the central government’s presence at the 
local level. “If the District Commissioner and District Executive Director are central 
government employees, what is the role of the local government then?”(KII, LGA17). This 
implies that local government administration is strongly under the control of the central 
government. In essence, with discussions happening at the national level the new aid 
modality continues to destabilise the district level. 
Political devolution has been partially achieved. It is noteworthy also that the legislators at 
local level (Members of Parliament and Councillors) are elected locally to defend local 
interests. Local representatives are elected democratically and usually three names are 
nominated for each constituency. These names will be sent to the respective national 
political party central committee for approval which usually approves the leading contender, 
although, in some cases the second or third runners up have been approved instead to 
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participate in the election. This shows that even political parties are centralised, which 
sometimes makes legislators accountable to the party rather than to the constituency. In 
one instance, one councillor said “In our district, it is a problem when the MP and the 
district party chairperson are friends. We just cannot decide beneficial things or challenge 
awkward plans because they can turn against us” (KII, LGA 18). Also, “The mayor is doing 
nothing because he is serving few people above him and not local interests” (KII, LGA 18). 
Changes to budget support have not given local legislators an opportunity to engage in the 
national level policy discussions but have opened up chances for the public to challenge 
their local Members of Parliament and Councillors.  
Financial Decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation under the new aid modality has yet to work well. Many sources of 
revenue that used to be collected and expended locally are now under the authority of the 
central government and collected by its agency, the Tanzania Revenue Authority.  Local 
governments have few internal sources (KII, LGA 10). These internal sources cannot suffice 
to meet financial obligation of the local government. The central government was supposed 
to provide alternative block grants known as “general purpose grants” to pay for either 
scrapped levies or sources that were centralised (KII, LGA 11). The central government does 
provide these block grants, but they are insufficient and do not subsidise all lost revenue 
sources (KII, LGA 3).  For example, in the 2010 fiscal year both Kongwa and Arusha district 
councils had received around only 50% of grants from the central government allocation 
which, in full, makes up over 80% of the councils’ budget (KII, LGA 1, and LGA 2).  Because of 
this, then, nearly half of planned activities are not able to be completed in the specified time.  
There is evidence that activities either overrun into another fiscal year or stay uncompleted 
(KII, LGA 6).  Budget support was supposed to consolidate financial sources and procedures 
centrally, but with planning and expenditure decided locally at district level. However, there 
is clearly a gap between national level and district level; therefore fiscal decentralisation 
under budget support is not working well. 
Consequently, LGAs have partial autonomy over decisions over allocation of resources. 
Strong control from the central government coupled with limited resources make LGAs even 
weaker and more dependent than they used to be during project support.  Flexibility in the 
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use of resources is limited to the use of their own resources, especially funds collected from 
local revenues. Interviews with research participants revealed that it is quite hard for LGAs 
to use allocated funds from the central government on other projects that were not 
budgeted  as needs arises (KII, LGA 8). Only locally collected revenues will be used in this 
way. In case of emergencies or change in plans due to unforeseeable circumstances, local 
governments face hard circumstances to implement projects. Budgetary amendments take 
so long and in such a way that approvals from treasury usually take over six months which 
makes it irrelevant in a given fiscal year. Local governments tried approvals before but have 
later given up and now they pursue different strategies, especially using locally collected 
revenues in case of changes in project circumstances in the course of implementation.  
Likewise, on other arising issues it is even difficult to use funds from donors flexibly. 
Although the procedures, regulations, and frameworks which were set by the central 
government are said to be beneficial in terms of accountability, inflexibility is a problem: it 
takes a lot of processes to make these funds available for daily use. 
Local governments face funding delays from central government. In May-June (2010) only 
50% of funds designated for development projects and recurrent expenditure in education 
and other sectors were received at the district level (KII, LGA 2 and LGA 6). The experience 
of local government staff is that it was really difficult to run government activities with half 
the annual budget (KII, LGA 4). Local government copes by employing different techniques 
to survive; for instance, to gradually prepay suppliers and contractors in the hope that they 
will deliver services in due time. However, this method is limited to high-demand service 
sectors such as education and health. 
The move to budget support has strengthened LGA’s financial procedures according to 
district planning departments (KII, LGA 8 and 9). On the other hand, this move has 
centralised financial control to the central government. The Ministry of Finance sets budget 
ceilings and guideline frameworks.  The Ministry of Finance can strike out anything 
exceeding the ceiling. At the same time local governments cannot alter plans; if they must 
do so, an approval has to be sought. It is said that an approval to use funding on a different 
way will take more than six months, and actors in local governments feel it is useless to 
apply for approvals because of the bureaucracy involved (KII, LGA 9). The response option is 
to use their own limited resources for emergency expenditures or changes in 
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implementation circumstances. In extreme cases the local government will defy accounting 
procedures to meet expenses during an emergency or changing project implementation 
circumstances by allocating financial resources to a new budget item under the name of the 
“real” budget item known to the Treasury. “It is not ethical really, but what can we do?” (KII, 
LGA 8). 
 
5.4.2 Civil Society Organisations 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been operating in Tanzania since before 
independence in 1961.  The flourishing of national NGOs came in about the mid-1980s. The 
number of NGOs continued to increase until the mid-2000s when growth became marginal. 
There are varying reports about the number of NGOs in Tanzania because formerly they 
were registered with two different government departments. In 1995 there were 800 NGOs, 
at least 75% of which had registered after 1990 (Mercer, 2003, p. 754). In 2000, the number 
was estimated to be 8499 (Lange, 2000, p. 6). Figures registered on the web directory of 
Civil Society Directory as of January 2011 record 3295 NGOs (CSOFTz, 2011).  Another 
reason to explain the discrepancy in figures is that not all NGOs are members of the 
Foundation of Civil Society. Furthermore, there could be duplication and/or omission within 
registering bodies. 
Project support opened advocacy and policy engagement space for CSOs. At national level 
CSOs’ participation in the education sector has been strong.  Also, in key national 
development plans such as National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES), CSOs participated 
strongly. There was some participation of CSOs in the later aid-influenced first generation 
poverty reduction strategies (PRSP). Participation and consultations were strong during the 
second and now third generation poverty reduction strategies which involved CSOs at 
national and regional levels.  
CSOs did not become active in advocacy, lobbying, and activism until the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s. In the education sector, the Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) and 
individual national CSOs such as Hakielimu and Maarifa ni Ufunguo have made a great 
contribution.  These CSOs work in research, advocacy, and policy engagement.  International 
NGOs also played a key part especially in service delivery and early institutional 
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arrangements with regards to participation in national policy-making and implementation 
initiatives. Both national and international NGOs have been actively engaged in policy 
advocacy.  
CSOs were involved in policy-making processes early in the 2000s but even more in the mid 
2000s. In preparation and implementation of the education Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), 
funding modality civil society organisations were actively involved. In the later 2000s it is 
said that CSOs were actively engaged in Public Expenditure Reviews in this sector (KII, CSO 
2). The education sector is the most developed in terms of collaboration between civil 
society, donors, and the central government agencies.  
Changing aid modality towards budget support first attracted and engaged local and 
international civil society in Tanzania. In the formulation of the first generation PRSP, there 
was a huge reaction from CSOs. First, some strong coalitions of CSOs were against the 
process altogether, citing its deficiency and being at the heart of the failed mainstream 
neoliberal development agenda. Second, CSOs decided to join the government and DPs in 
the process rather than to lose track of the process.   
At national level, CSOs became active in policy engagement especially in formal Public 
Expenditure Reviews and ad-hoc meetings between the government and donors.  Recent 
development in policy engagement has seen declining CSOs involvement in day-to-day 
policy processes. Research participants pointed to civil society organisations distancing 
themselves from some of the policy dialogue avenues and their suspicion of being 
deliberately sidelined (KII, CSO 1).   Due to poor engagement between civil society and the 
government, some CSOs have started to switch back towards service delivery and capacity 
building.  Noticeably, while TEN/MET has continued to participate in policy discussions less 
frequently other local NGOs, once active, have retreated.  Hakielimu, for instance, has 
distanced itself from education policy meetings recently as have other CSOs in the 
education sector. CSOs feel these meetings have become “tokenistic”: “We discuss things, 
provide inputs to policy discussions but rarely are the issues considered serious by the 
government” (KII, CSO 1). Key inputs of CSOs were left out in the new Education Policy 
which is set to be published in a final draft soon.  MOEVT argued that some of those inputs 
were merely a set of activities, therefore they could not be taken on broad policy issues (KII, 
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MOEVT 1). However, CSO contributors to this study claim that if this was true then 
facilitators failed to show the distinction between policy strategies and activities, and did 
not make it clear that activities cannot be included in a policy document. 
Process problems exist in relation to policy engagement between civil society and the 
government. CSOs highlighted that, recently, scheduled policy discussion meetings have 
become rare. Meetings are called haphazardly and at short notice. In some meetings CSOs 
have not been invited at all even if the structure developed in budget support requires that 
they should be present (KII, CSO 2). Most of Technical Working Group under Education 
Sector Development Committee has one CSOs representative.  In the light of the Paris 
Declaration principle of ownership, the central government, through MOEVT, is tasked to 
set meeting dates and invite other players to these meetings. However, CSOs feel late or 
non invitations are a deliberate ploy to sideline them from the discussions. This is one of the 
reasons for less CSOs participation.  
Consistently, CSO participation is becoming issue-based rather than being included in day-
to-day policy engagement such as in Public Expenditure Reviews. For example when the 
government started Education and Training Policy review and the third generation PRSP 
CSOs were quite active especially Dar es Salaam-based CSOs (KII, CSO 1).    
In theory, the Joint Assistance Strategy through budget support is meant to consolidate 
various aid activities and plans into one plan (the country document) then space for policy 
engagement is opened up in avenues such as annual sector reviews and general budget 
support review.  CSOs are actually included in the structure of the sector Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs) which involve government representatives and donors. However CSOs’ 
participation recently has not been regular and is declining.  
“Interestingly, however, some of the outspoken NGOs are implicitly withdrawing from this 
space partly because they see it as a waste of time – it’s token involvement, ideas aren't 
really taken on board, papers never consistently made available in advance. Also partly 
because the real difference is to be made through public engagement, and getting 
parliamentarians to put on the pressure” (KII, CSO 6).  This implies that CSOs focus their 
activities on advocacy and public engagement to get legislators on board in terms of policy 
agenda and educating normal people about their rights to question the government.  
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Likewise regional education civil society organisations have focused their activities towards 
public engagement and less with policy advocacy at local level. “We now train school 
management committees, ward councillors, and community members on many issues 
including budget tracking so that they may ask relevant questions”(KII, CSO 4). 
The presence or absence of CSOs does not appear to bother the government’s 
representatives.  Donors are aware of and concerned about the situation.  Donors have at 
some points encouraged CSOs to participate, sometimes by extending the invitation from 
the government. “This is not a good time for them to lose hope, because partnership means 
commitment, even when one partner is not cooperating well” (KII, DP1).  CSOs are giving up, 
they do not believe in the system any more so they do not prioritise these meetings. This is 
not a formal decision though.  Donors think that part of the responsibility lies with the CSOs, 
“Why can’t they demand to be involved effectively with support from donors?” (KII, DP 2).  
It is noteworthy that recently the situation has improved dramatically. Although there are 
few CSOs in the education sector at policy level; discussions in this sector are said to be one 
of the best (KII, DP1).  TEN/MET participates actively and has the mandate to nominate 
other members to participate in policy dialogue.  In the case of late invitations, while donors 
sometimes have the same problem, given the importance of the partnership, many times 
donors participate actively. However, it is to be noted also that some donors have irregular 
participation in these meetings. “They are preoccupied in supporting financially rather than 
coming to meetings” (KII, DP1).  Some DPs are also tired of too many meetings they have to 
endure (KII, DP 3).   
CSOs outside Dar es Salaam have difficulty being part of these meetings. Short notice 
invitations make it hard for regional civil society organisations to participate. Up-country 
CSOs need to be well resourced to travel to Dar es Salaam for these meetings, frequently at 
short notice and with unknown schedules. Even well resourced up-country CSOs find it 
really hard for them to attend short notice meetings. TEN/MET has tried to solve this 
problem by inviting strong Dar es Salaam based CSOs. However, this has increased the 
knowledge gap between Dar es Salaam-based and regional CSOs. Regional CSOs hardly 
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understand what is going on and this is definitely eroding trust between well connected Dar 
es Salaam-based CSOs and isolated regional CSOs (KII, CSO 3).  
Civil society organisations have increased public engagement jointly using the issue-based 
policy network, the Policy Forum.  The Policy Forum meets once a month in a breakfast talk 
where selected CSOs present brief research findings or issues to invited stakeholders such as 
donors, the government, and the private sector. 
The watchdog role of CSOs is gradually changing from direct confrontation or dialogue with 
the government and aid donors to public engagement.  Public engagement is now done 
using means such as training legislators, media, and school children. CSOs public 
engagement has greatly impacted the general population understanding level of policy 
issues facing education in Tanzania. Also civil society had great impact in public engagement 
through training and dialogue with school management committees, ward councillors, 
members of parliament, village/street leaders, and the general public. The public now can 
question about various issues in education sector and demand responsibility from the 
government.  
The situation is not the same in other areas of the country, however; for instance in Kongwa, 
where CSOs’ activities are very limited. There are very few active local national CSOs in the 
district. These CSOs are providing various services such as school materials for orphaned 
children, school feeding, and water infrastructure around schools. Occasionally they are 
engaged in policy dialogue at national level in issues that involve wider CSOs participation.  
Even international NGOs present in the district are engaged in service delivery more than 
policy advocacy or even capacity building in pertinent policy issues.  
Up-country national CSOs in general have little or no policy engagement activities at district 
level. In Arusha, where there is a flourishing NGO sector, the situation is similar to Kongwa 
with quite a few NGOs involved in district policy engagement. The legal working structure of 
the district council formal meetings does not have space for CSOs engagement.  However 
CSOs are welcome to give their ideas through sector departmental meetings in sectors 
where these CSOs are active. Another point of entry is through personal contacts with 
legislators, ward councillors, or members of parliament. Ideally, in the context of local 
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government reform program in Tanzania, policy engagement space for district and regional 
NGOs and CSOs networks should be opening up but in practice this is far from the truth.  
Issue-based involvement of district CSOs is still haphazard depending on the pace at which 
national level actors communicate information to their allies or partners at the district level. 
For instance, many local district level CSOs participated in the Public Expenditure Tracking 
Study in basic education (PETS) (KII, CSO 4).  “It really depends how much an NGO is known 
or connected” (KII, CSO 5). 
 
5.4.3 Development Partners 
Changing aid modalities has definitely changed the role of the central government in 
relation to development partners or donors. Donors operated almost exclusively in isolation 
before new aid modalities were implemented. This had both disadvantages and some 
benefits for both sides.  On the side of the donors, one of the problems was increased 
transaction costs; too many donors were using substantial resources to deliver aid to the 
same government and or people using their own financial system. On the government’s side, 
there were too many activities, for example, reports, in various formats and they had to 
endure many mission visits. The Paris Declaration intended to solve these problems by 
introducing principles of ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results, and mutual 
accountability. Fundamentally, the government of Tanzania was at the seat of development 
policy-making (ownership) and using own financial systems (alignment).  Tanzania was one 
of the first countries where donors organised themselves to partner with the government 
under the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS). DAC donors started TAS and later other non-
DAC donors joined in. Donors in TAS became more organised into Joint Assistance Strategy 
(JAST). However even after the Joint Assistance Strategy, which aims to unify donors’ 
systems and procedures, still there is evidence of uncoordinated efforts (KII, DP1).  General 
Budget Support has given both the central government and donors a platform to amicably 
resolve things. But still, because of varying degrees of commitments or interests, the 
government of Tanzania can sometimes isolate donors to its advantage (KII, DP 2).  
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Currently, there are eleven bilateral and three multilateral donors providing General Budget 
Support under the Partnership Framework Memorandum (PFM) between the Government 
of Tanzania and the GBS partners signed in January 2006. 
Development Partners have put in place structures to promote development effectiveness 
and increasingly speak with one voice on key development issues. A Development Partner 
Group (DPG) is the coordinating body for Tanzania’s thirty-five bilateral and multilateral 
development partners.14 The DPG meets monthly and is jointly chaired by the UN and a 
bilateral donor (rotating). It has a permanent Secretariat and a number of sector specific 
sub-groups. General Budget Support (GBS) is provided by fourteen donors15, up from five 
donors in 2000. GBS donors provide aid based on a common performance assessment 
framework and joint annual review processes.  Donors are, to the extent permitted by their 
own mandates, increasingly using government treasury, procurement, and financial 
management systems, and are applying programme-based approaches aligning their 
financial support behind the government strategies and programmes in health, education, 
transport, public sector reform, public financial management reform, water, HIV/AIDS, Local 
Government, forestry, private sector reform, and agriculture. 
The increased role of the central government in policy engagement processes has given 
bargaining advantage to the government. It was learned that out of fourteen donors 
supporting the Tanzanian general budget, eleven were once quite active in annual budget 
reviews and now about nine are involved consistently. Even fewer donors are involved 
consistently in Ministry of Education and Vocational Training policy discussions.  Donors face 
the same challenges as CSOs, such as late invitations to policy meetings and contributions 
and inputs being ignored. Consequently, some of the donors decided to believe that the 
system would work well on its own, hence they have reduced their involvement.  Now 
donors are categorised as “active” and “less active” in terms of policy engagement but both 
groups still give aid in budget support (KII, DP3). 
                                                          
14
  The Development Partner Group includes: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States, United Nations (UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, IFAD, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNAIDS, UNCDF, WFP, UNHCR, FAO, UNESCO, 
WHO, UN-Habitat), African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank.  
15
  African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, EC, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Word Bank. 
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In theory there is strong donor cooperation but in practice it is still difficult for donors to 
work together even under the auspices of much the publicised Joint Assistance Strategy in 
Tanzania. Research participants revealed that donors have their own organisational issues 
to deal with so it will take time to work together in a harmonised manner (KII, DP1). Thus, 
the harmonisation agenda is challenged in practice. The central government has become 
quite flexible in dealing with donors depending on what issue is really pressing; for instance, 
under general budget support, it has been easy to present plans and anticipate 
predictability of aid flows. Likewise, follow up to disbursement schedules and funds 
transfers has been made easier for the central government. However, in terms of getting 
favour from one donor over to the other within the harmonisation arrangement “it is still 
possible and widely used”(KII, MoFEA). The central government is known to have taken 
advantage of the situation, sometimes by dividing the donors club by playing one against 
the other in issues. This is has been possible because some less active donors depend on 
information from active colleagues or the central government representatives (KII, DP3).  
Noticeably, government has had long term relationships with some donors. This has made 
personal level contacts possible but this has proved problematic with the harmonisation 
agenda.  
Long term commitment of some donors with the government of Tanzania, and especially 
the role of personal relationship between individuals made donors trust the government. 
This has had both positive and negative impacts: positive in terms of long term commitment 
to development, and negative when it comes to centralised decisions from the government 
and “explaining later” to donors (KII, DP2). 
 
5.4.4 Local Communities 
Aid effectiveness principles, in accordance with the Paris Declaration, aim to empower 
national governments to deliver development outcomes intended to bring improved social 
and other services to the people. However, in Tanzania there are unintended consequences 
which include the government being too far from communities and not directly responsible 
to them. Because local government authorities have become closer to the people, this 
makes them responsible to communities. Community members are discouraged by the fact 
that they do not get direct feedback from the central government. “Whenever the central 
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government leader is around, usually most of negative things or dysfunctional at the 
community level are blamed on the local government authority” (KII, LGA3). 
Under the new aid modalities the central government is less responsible to communities 
and poor communities have fewer options to claim rights.  This has led to declining 
community participation in development projects which need community contribution and 
ownership (KII, LGA12). On top of declining community participation, centralised decision-
making and sometimes implementation has resulted in resistance in some cases. For 
example, in Sombetini (Arusha Municipality) an urban street, community members 
protested against the opening of the low quality dispensary building. The Local Government 
minister was met with placards calling for a stop to the exercise because the dispensary in 
question was built under very low quality standards and an inquiry over fraud was required. 
As a result of the protest, the minister did not open the dispensary to wait for the inquiry as 
community members demanded (KII-LGA13). 
The new aid modality has been implemented with a multiplicity of other initiatives in the 
central government systems.  In order to promote participatory planning in Decentralization 
by Devolution (D by D) governance system, the development planning process has to start 
at the village or street level, and then priorities are sent to the ward level.  The Ward 
Development Committee (WDC) – which includes LGA officials, sector specialists, and 
elected officials – compiles ward priorities and forwards these to the District Council.  The 
Council forwards these priorities to Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and 
Local Government which gives feedback to the District Council. The District Council then 
sends the final annual plan and budget to the Treasury. In this long process some priorities 
from communities get adjusted and/or diluted and community members do not get 
feedback as to what happened with their priorities.  This discourages long term 
commitment of community members to the central government to solve their problems. 
The degree of trust in the government and its organs is declining (KII, LGA 12 &13). 
School management committees, as a community entry point, have changed greatly under 
the new aid modality.  Membership of the committee is comprised of parents and teachers. 
It has not been established what the exact number of people an ideal school committee 
should have. However, in the two research sites, the number varied. Njiro primary school in 
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Arusha had eleven members:  three teachers (all women) including the head teacher who 
acts as the committee’s secretary, seven parents of children studying at this school (two 
women and five men) and one man from St Mbaaga Catholic Mission which was invited 
provide a representative to participate in school committee activities.  In Kongwa primary 
school the committee has eight members: two teachers (one man and one woman), five 
parents (three men and two women) and one representative of a faith-based organisation.  
It is just by choice that these schools have engaged faith-based organisations in the 
committee.  Although both schools receive assistance from NGOs to help orphaned or 
extremely poor children, only the Njiro primary school committee has been trained by the 
local NGO. In terms of school committee composition, Kongwa primary school is somewhat 
unusual because they invite one guest representative to their meetings. They have been 
inviting the local ward councillor into their meetings so that he can take their concerns to 
higher meetings. This is supplementary to formal channels of communication through the 
head teacher and committee chairperson who are expected to work as upward linkages.  
While child rights civil society advocates for older children’s representation on school 
committees, this was not occurring in the schools where interviews were done.  
There are some issues with regards to running the schools.  Funding from both the central 
government and the local government is quite limited. At the same time, community 
contributions are declining and are confined to parents only.  Another reason for resource 
constraints comes from the overall delay and subsequent underfunding from the central 
government. By May, 2010 Njiro primary school in Arusha had received only 50% of the 
budgeted amount of capitation grant while at Kongwa primary school only 40% of funds had 
been received. Inquiries at the district Department of Education in Kongwa district showed 
that there were actually funds for the last quarter of the year to be disbursed to all primary 
schools before the end of May, but that is only about 10-15% of the annual budget. In 
Arusha, no more funds for the fiscal year 2009/10 were budgeted for schools. The end of 
fiscal of year in Tanzania is June 30th so any delay past this date means there is no way that 
government institutions such as schools will recover the funds. Interviews with head 
teachers and district education officers for primary education confirmed that this has been 
the trend for the past three years (KII, LGA 4 & SC2).  
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Capitation and development grants were established under the Primary Education 
Development Plan (PEDP Ӏ) in 2001. After the abolition of school fees, capitation grants were 
meant to provide resources for recurrent expenditure calculated at the rate of Tshs 10,000 
per child.  At the same time development grants were meant to support classrooms and 
teachers’ houses construction; this was also calculated at Tshs 10,000 per child. 
Communities were required to build the classrooms to lintel level then development grants 
would be used to complete the building. This was successful after the first three years of 
Primary Education Development Program (PEDP Ӏ) between 2002-2006, which raised 
enrolment to over 100%. However PEDP ӀӀ did not work well in terms of resources.  In both 
schools where this research was conducted, Kongwa and Njiro, in the last three years only a 
small amount of capitation grants were received up to the end of fiscal year. In 2010/11 
fiscal year, for example, Njiro primary school has received only Tshs 5,200 per child.  
Interviews with head teachers and committee members indicate that this amount is 
inadequate. “Even if they would disburse Tshs 10,000, it is still not enough to run a school” 
(KII, SC 1).  On the contrary, the amount of capitation grants is said to be decreasing each 
year (KII, SC 2). Likewise there were almost no development grants provided to Njiro and 
Kongwa primary schools in the last two years despite the fact that they both have classroom 
building projects.  Interviews with the district authorities revealed that development grants 
to primary schools recently has been very limited and goes only to new schools and the 
focus now is on ward secondary schools (KII, LGA 3).  Kongwa Primary School had a 
friendship connection with a school in Germany which has assisted building teachers’ offices 
and two classrooms.  Parents in both schools used to contribute towards building projects 
prior to budget support. However they gradually reduced physical and material support 
after tendering processes started. Interviews revealed that there is a strong feeling that if 
contractors are engaged under the new arrangement then everything is paid for.  This has 
made community mobilisation work and supervision work by the district difficult (KII, LGA 
14). However, in issues that directly benefit children, most parents or guardians will 
contribute. In both schools there is a parents’ voluntary food contribution for children’s 
lunch. In both areas where parents are proved to be too poor to give, local NGOs provide 
support by directly donating to schools.  
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Changes to aid modality have contributed to improvement in transparency and 
accountability. It is difficult to ensure a fully transparent government but “significant 
improvements have been made the past 10 years” (KII, MoFEA). However, some of the 
reforms encouraged by donors have affected local actors negatively. Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP) for instance have brought some benefits to the central government 
because it does not need to deal with one of its department to provide services but 
government departments and agencies just manage policy level and the private sector 
deliver services. PPP has come with disadvantages too; for example, corruption in 
purchasing and procurement of services (KII, CSO 2). Also it has brought problems to local 
government officials and communities. For example, contracting all of the public jobs such 
as construction of classrooms has raised costs and at the same time discouraged local 
community participation in development projects (KII, LGA 16). As explained above, 
communities perceive that the contractor has been paid to do all the work so there is no 
need of community contribution (KII, LGA 12). On the contrary, however, the local 
government has the mandate to persuade community members to contribute resources – 
including their labour – as required, for most government or donor funded projects.    
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the changed role of the central government under the new aid 
modality and its impact on other actors.  First and foremost, the central government has 
become stronger compared to other actors. It is a good sign for country ownership 
principles under Paris Declaration. However, in the process most other actors such as the 
local government, civil society organisations, and the private sector have been alienated.    
Also the central government does not necessarily honour or take on board policy inputs and 
ideas from other actors. This has contributed to declining CSOs engagement due to fatigue 
and feelings of tokenistic dialogue. CSOs have dramatically focussed to empower the public 
directly and through the media about the government accountability and policy issues 
rather than facing the government directly.  At district level, space has not opened up for 
CSOs’ dialogue; rather civil society organisations are still engaged in service delivery at this 
level.   Local government authorities face limited resources with increased responsibility. In 
the end, schools, too, receive limited resources making them very difficult to run.  Further to 
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this, due to lack of awareness communities tend to refrain from voluntary participation in 
development projects involving engagement of the private sector.  
This chapter has looked at actors in education policy development. Policy-making processes 
and subsequent outcomes are explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Processes and Outcomes 
6.1 Introduction 
Tanzania’s budget in the 2010 fiscal year was comprised of 25% foreign aid, which is a 
remarkable reduction. During the last five years foreign aid in the form of budget support, 
projects, and basket funding has been nearly 40%.  This made the country a favourable spot 
for countless activities involving local and international, and state and non-state actors. This 
chapter attempts to address research findings and discussion of processes involved and the 
subsequent outcomes. 
First, the chapter charts how aid processes have established a complexity of dialogue at 
national level.  The aid dialogue structure, involving projects, basket, and budget support 
separately, is complex and time-consuming. There is strong dialogue and engagement 
between the Tanzanian Government and development partners but civil society 
involvement is quickly declining.  
Second, the chapter explores the interface between policy-making and implementation.  In 
practice, policy-making is not a problem but inadequate implementation of those policies 
and strategies is. There is a lack of cohesion between policies and implementation.  Third, 
the chapter discusses non state actors and donors fading expectations of aid effectiveness 
principles and the subsequent processes. These expectations have yet to be met and 
scepticism is creeping in. 
Fourth, this chapter sheds light on the outcomes of decentralisation in the aid arena.  There 
is increased centralisation in practice in the name of Decentralisation by Devolution. The 
fifth aspect addressed in this chapter is transparency and accountability.  Accountability and 
transparency is more than posting financial figures on public notice boards.  Sixth, there is a 
considerable decline of community involvement in local development initiatives.  This 
chapter explains reasons and the subsequent results on development activities in education 
sector.   
Seventh, this chapter outlines aid modality effectiveness. There is a mixed perception of 
which aid modality is more effective. Eighth, confrontation and compromise encountered in 
decision-making and implementation between central government representatives locally, 
local councillors and local government staff are explored in this chapter.  Finally the chapter 
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compiles analytical perceptions of research participants on aid exit strategy as pursued by 
the central government to end aid dependency in future.  
 
6.2 Aid processes and complexity of dialogue at national Level 
The first few years after renewed relationships between the Government of Tanzania and its 
aid donors the focus turned to coordination, harmonisation, and nurturing country 
ownership. Basically, this was the intention of the change in aid modality from Project 
support to budget support. There is increased engagement between the Government of 
Tanzania, Development Partners, and Civil Society Organisations in policy-making processes. 
Other actors in the picture are Local Government Authorities, Legislators (Parliamentarians 
and Councillors), private sector, the media, and local communities. 
Policy processes are centred on the national development strategy regardless of aid 
modality.  The national development strategy is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper over 
a particular period, usually five years. The second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (2005-2010)has been renamed in Tanzania as National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), or its Kiswahili version which is mainly used in all dialogues: 
Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania (MKUKUTA).  The number of 
events, meetings and linkages will probably decrease, but in the current set up interviewees 
confirmed that it is complicated to conduct high quality discussions, dialogue, and 
implementation (KII, DP1 & KII, MoFEA). All these activities rob the local actors, and the 
government, of opportunities to own the processes.  
Aid in Tanzania operates on various levels and uses various platforms. There is a high level 
Joint Coordinating Group (JCG).  The coordinating group is intended to ensure the highest 
level of dialogue in coordination of development assistance, policy discussions, 
harmonisation, and alignment of donors’ programmes, projects, and budget support to 
finance the implementation of national development strategies. The JCG is comprised of 
high level leaders such as Permanent Secretaries and donors’ Heads of Cooperation 
including heads of bilateral organisations.  
In practice, Joint Coordinating Group uses an informal forum, the Development Cooperation 
Forum (DCF), for the purpose of dialogue. DCF consists of high level Government of 
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Tanzania and donor representatives. DCF is chaired by the Government of Tanzania’s Chief 
Secretary and attended by selected donors at Ambassador or head of multilateral 
organisations level. 
In special circumstances in these high level meetings the Government of Tanzania 
representation include some ministers. The Government representatives are the initiators 
and leaders of the dialogue.  On rare occasions CSOs participate in high level meetings as 
spectators.  CSOs expect invitation although there is no Government obligation to invite 
them.  High level meetings are for strategic policy direction.  These meetings open space for 
strategic debate, consultation, and policy advice on national development strategies such as 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), Joint Assistance Strategy 
(JAST), cross-cutting issues, key policy reforms, and aid exit strategy. One of the key 
outcomes of these meetings is the advice given on high-level political decisions. DCF feeds 
into JAST processes for effective linkages.  Meetings at the DCF level are few: at most, two 
formal meetings per year, including the annual review.  DCF’s unplanned meetings on top of 
these are many. However, coordination among donors is frequent: for instance, about 11 
high level Development Partners Group meetings of deputy heads of missions and technical 
advisors are held per year to coordinate donors’ activities before meeting with the 
government. 
Development Partners Group (DPG) is a working arm of all donors. This group is meant to 
replace local Development Assistance Committee (DAC). DPG is inclusive of DAC and non-
DAC donors and is designed to embrace harmonisation according to the Paris Declaration as 
well as to engage effectively with the now supposedly unified Government of Tanzania 
under JAST.  Donors providing general budget support are linked to Joint Coordinating 
Forum and, in practice, they have Working Groups connected at Public Expenditure Reviews 
(PERs).  Direct GBS is the Government of Tanzania’s most preferred method of aid delivery, 
followed by basket funding when appropriate. However, because a substantial amount of 
aid is still comprised of project and basket funding, and although GBS group is linked to DPG 
at a high level, there are, in practice, still separate meetings and dialogue between the 
Government and GBS donors and the Government and other donors in DPG.  A new 
structure has been proposed which will include all DPG donors into mainstream dialogue 
with GBS. 
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Dialogue in the context of aid coordination is quite complex but overall coordination on the 
side of donors’ lies with Development Partners Group (DPG). Interviewees in this research 
agreed that there has been considerable increase in transaction costs including number of 
aid-related events.  Some participants were hoping for a decline in the number of these 
events in the near future when most of aid is to be channelled through either basket 
funding using Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) or budget support; currently however, 
activities to set up structures have increased (KII, DP 1). Meetings, reports, missions, and 
other donor-donor or donor-recipient or intra-recipient events are termed as transaction 
costs (TCs).  Efforts to research and quantify these events in the Tanzanian context have 
proved difficult (Dyer, 2005, p. 7). However, suggestions were made to focus on what sort of 
transaction costs might be measured such as the number of reports, missions, meetings, 
legal instruments, audit requirements, and staff. Overall, it is regarded as valid to treat these 
transaction costs as part of the whole spectrum of donor-recipient activities to achieve aid 
objectives (Dyer, 2005).  
Donor-donor coordination of activities and events within DGP and the budget support group 
and between all donors and the government are still quite many. The government of 
Tanzania had asked donors for a quite period during budget preparation where no donor 
mission, review, and meeting is allowed. Despite having “quiet period” increased donors 
activities are exhaustive to government staff (KII, DP 1 & KII, MoFEA).  In a letter dated 8th 
April 2010, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
reminded donors of the “quiet period” they agreed with the government. The letter 
provided specific dates for the quiet period between 1st April and 30th August 2010 to be 
observed except for activities that have been programmed during the period (MoFEA, 2010) 
(see appendix 4). In future, the numbers of these events are expected to decrease as 
systems put in place begin to stabilise. 
Formal meetings are supposed to follow the overall aid “dialogue” structure in the country 
as shown by figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 Current dialogue structure 
 
Source: DPG Report On Tanzania Proposed PER/MKUKUTA Dialogue Structure (2010) 
 
The Government of Tanzania, donors, and other local actors aspire for effective, high quality 
and regular dialogue to achieve national development, growth, and poverty reduction goals 
(URT, 2006).  There are many processes such as Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, and General Budget Support.  These 
meetings often have overlapping agendas and schedules, also multiple and overlapping 
membership with weak inter-linkages and unclear selection criteria.  Having too many 
events and reporting has been highlighted in JAST review report. It was noted that having a 
multitude of events has led to high transaction costs as well as insufficient quality and 
ineffective dialogue arrangements and their expected outputs (URT, 2006). For instance, as 
shown in figure 6.1, donors and government ministries and agencies (MDAs) meet and 
engage in sector dialogue and they are direct members in PER Cluster Working Groups 
(CWGs).  MDAs represent their own ministries rather than the sector at cluster level. 
Structures for national dialogue are in place throughout the year for the PER process, but 
are missing for NSGRP/MKUKUTA process in terms of policy dialogue on NSGRP/MKUKUTA 
implementation.  Study participants disclosed that the only multi-stakeholder forum for this 
purpose is the MKUKUTA Annual Review/Poverty Policy Week (KII, CSO 1). 
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Non-state actors (CSOs) are represented at the annual poverty review week by one member 
chosen by their sector umbrella organisation. CSOs participate in thematic, sector, and PER 
CWGs. They also participate in NSGRP/MKUKUTA Annual Review or Poverty Policy week. 
However, they do not participate in PER Macro group dialogue, or in GBS Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs) and GBS CWGs.   
The GBS donors group faces the same problem as government ministries and agencies of 
multiple representations in more or less similar meetings.  Donors committed to 
contributing towards national development strategy, a third generation PRSP (MKUKUTA), 
have their own set of Cluster Working Groups and Technical Working Groups.  A troika plus 
model is employed in this context.  These meetings are between the Government and GBS 
donors known as Poverty Reduction through Budget Support group (PRBS). In theory, the 
Government-approved dialogue structure, GBS, is supposed to be an integral part of the 
dialogue with Public Expenditure Reviews and NSGRP/MKUKUTA to the Development 
Partners Group (DPG) overall structure. However, in practice GBS donors occupy much of 
the dialogue at cluster level (KII, DP3).  “GBS Donors (14 donors) are sort of part of DPG 
group, but not very much because it requires certain actions in engagement with the 
government in which other donors in DGP cannot be part of” (KII, DP2).  In the troika plus 
model the General Budget Support Donors Group works in such a way that in every sector 
there are three donors working together with one lead, deputy lead, and an active member. 
The World Bank is a permanent member in the troika model. The current (2010) Chair of the 
PRBS troika plus donors is Norway, Denmark is Outgoing Chair and the EU Delegation is 
Incoming Chair. 
The dialogue structure makes engagement complicated and tiresome for regular members: 
it is no wonder that it has been difficult for donors, the government, and non-state actors to 
meet regularly (KII, DP 1).  Efforts have been made for both donors and the government to 
come up with a more simplified dialogue structure which would facilitate the high quality 
dialogue and efficient implementation every stakeholder longs for. Interestingly, there is a 
newly proposed dialogue structure, especially after the JAST review study in 2011, which 
will definitely pave the way for JAST ӀӀ for another phase. Figure 6.2 is the proposed new 
dialogue structure. In this structure, DPG donors’ work is going to adopt the format of PRBS 
donors. In practice, they will continue to fund sectors or projects in sectors, but under the 
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big picture of the whole budget in light of NSGRP (MKUKUTA) Public Expenditure Review 
targets.  Within this arrangement the Development Partner Group (DPG) must somehow 
start to focus on outcomes rather than outputs as at present.  However, in terms of the 
structure, PRBS donors will be integrated into DPG, with Joint Coordination Group (JCG) as 
the strategic leaders.  The proposed new dialogue structure is meant to address challenges 
of the current structure including reduce overlapping of roles and meetings. It is also 
expected to minimise the current complexity. 
The proposed structure has the following functions (DPG, 2010): 
(i) Dialogue structure integrates, to the greatest extent possible, all existing 
processes (MKUKUTA, PER, JAST and GBS) thus combining dialogue on policy 
and budgetary/expenditure issues, in order to reduce overlaps and transaction 
costs.  
 
(ii) Dialogue structure has four levels: 
 
a) Sectors/thematic areas where MDAs (and active DPs) are direct members; 
and distinction is made between internal Government dialogue and 
dialogue between the Government, donors, and non-state actors 
 
b) Four Cluster Working Groups (CWGs), namely three CWGs corresponding 
to the three MKUKUTA Ӏ clusters: (1) Growth and  Income Poverty 
Reduction, (2) Improvement of Quality of Life and Social Well-Being, and 
(3) Governance and Accountability, where sectors/thematic areas are 
represented, as well as a MKUKUTA-PER Macro Group; 
 
c) The MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group where CWGs and the 
MKUKUTA-PER Macro Group are represented. The change of name from 
the previous PER Main Working Group to MKUKUTA-PER Main Working 
Group reflects the broadening of the dialogue agenda to include 
MKUKUTA and related policy issues 
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d) A Joint Government-donors Coordination Group (JCG), the highest level 
coordination structure drawing membership from Permanent Secretaries 
and Heads of Development Cooperation, and serving as a forum for 
dialogue in the coordination of development assistance, the 
harmonisation and alignment of Development Partners’ programmes, 
projects, and budget support in support of the implementation of 
MKUKUTA.  
 
(iii) Sectors/thematic areas and CWGs have a lead and deputy lead ministry (MDA) 
and a lead DP, which represent other members in dialogue at the next higher 
level: 
 
a) The sector/thematic area lead and deputy lead MDA – together with the 
lead DP – represent the sector/thematic area at cluster level, but can still 
be accompanied by sector experts if need arises; and 
 
b) The Cluster Working Group lead and deputy lead ministry (MDA) – 
together with the cluster lead donor – represent the CWG in the 
MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group, but may be accompanied by 
technical experts from sectors/clusters if the need arises. 
 
(iv) Annual Review consultative meetings will take place at sector/thematic area 
and national (MKUKUTA-PER) levels.   
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Figure 6.2 Proposed new dialogue structure 
 
 
 
Source: DPG Report On Tanzania Proposed PER/MKUKUTA Dialogue Structure (2010) 
 
The proposed new structure puts the Poverty Reduction Strategy at the centre of policy 
dialogue.  
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(KII, MoFEA). The disparity between policy-making and implementation was attributed to a 
number of factors. First, there is little coherence between institutions which are supposed 
to be working together towards implementing broad policy goals. An interview with the 
Government’s policy staff revealed that “there is almost no coherence between policy 
planning and implementation. It is like everybody is doing something different, sometimes 
with the same people” (KII, MOEVT).   Despite having MKUKUTA in place, almost every 
ministry and agency (MDAs) is undertaking their priorities in a different way from the 
agreed broad cluster strategies.  Lack of cohesion between MDAs is the core reason for poor 
implementation. However, there is also lack of cohesion within MDAs and weak linkage 
between ministries and local governments.  Structures to support unified government are 
slowly building up. The lack of cohesion is probably the outcome of attitude of the past and 
stakeholders being preoccupied with their own institutional matters and targets as the 
overall goal instead of the broad government agenda and issues. One donor commented 
that “what is lacking is strong leadership to carry out things beyond rhetoric” (KII, DP 2). 
Another reason attributed to poor implementation is that there is too much talk and little 
action. Meetings, events, and strategies are becoming too much. “People should talk less 
and do more really, it is hurting” (KII, MoFEA). In the education sector, for instance, there 
are plans to improve the quality of basic education with details of financing new 
infrastructure such as classrooms and teachers’ houses. However, all these are weakly 
linked to implementation.  Furthermore, interviews revealed that there is too much going 
on and little progress in reality (KII, MoFEA). There are many reforms going on at the same 
time – for example, Education Sector Reforms, Local Government Reform Program, Legal 
Sector Reform Program, and many other reforms. Another perspective points to the 
benefits government employees get to attend endless meetings. The informant said “There 
is virtually small progress in implementation, government staff go to these meetings for 
allowances and free lunches. The system is in bad shape; so sad, it is killing the country. It 
has been part of the system for so long in such a way people do not know how to survive. 
We need a bold person at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs to raise staff salaries 
and cut down allowances” (KII, DP1). 
Another crucial factor which holds back implementation of well made and planned policies 
is delay in resource disbursement. Delay in disbursement of funds occurs in three different 
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areas. Partly funds are delayed from donors due to cumbersome procedures and conditions. 
Also, to some degree delays are due to different budget cycles between donors’ home 
countries and Tanzania.  An example given is that the UK’s budget cycle commences in April 
while Tanzania’s budget commences in July (KII, MoFEA). Donors, on the other hand, 
thought different budget cycles was a small problem and attributed the problem of aid 
funds delay to the Tanzania Government. Donors pointed to the example of the 2010/11 
budget where the Government was supposed to present PER budget reports with attached 
Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators early in January; however, the reports 
came at the end of March (2010). PAF indicators are jointly assessed by both the 
Government and GBS donors; however, the process is owned by the Government.  In PAF 
assessments review non-state actors are excluded. “Unfortunately we had to reduce aid in 
the main budget in fiscal year 2010/11 by 200 billion Tanzanian shillings because of delayed 
and poor Performance Assessment Framework results” (KII, DP1).  The Government’s 
exchequer system was also blamed for delay, because even the Government’s own 
resources, accounting for over 60% of the budget, are disbursed late. “Tanzania inherited 
the colonial accounting system which takes a lot of time to release its own treasury funds to 
implementing institutions” (KII, DP3). 
At primary school level, this delay in funding has occurred for the last three years. It is 
probably contributed to by reasons already explained on the part of the Government and 
donors; but it could be more between the government and local government authorities, 
then local government authorities and schools. Evidence from the two schools that 
participated in this study showed that in the fiscal year 2009/10, schools received only 50% 
of the capitation grants funds to run schools.  However, the Government continued to pay 
teachers’ salaries without delays. 
 
6.4 Changing expectations in Tanzania in relation to aid effectiveness 
The Helleiner Report (Helleiner, et al., 1995) put Tanzania in the forefront of aid 
effectiveness processes.   The report recommended increased government ownership of key 
project/programme documents, budget, and implementation as well as the formulation of a 
national development vision including sector development strategies which were lacking.  It 
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was recommended that donors act coherently in order to avoid overwhelming the 
Government and to reduce transaction costs on both sides. The Helleiner Report (Helleiner, 
et al., 1995) pioneered early efforts of harmonisation and ownership for aid effectiveness. It 
was after this time that dialogue on development cooperation between the Government 
and donors increased.   
The major outcome of the government-donors revitalised dialogue was the formulation of 
Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS).  Processes to formulate TAS started in 1998/99 and it 
was finalised in 2002 following many sessions of dialogue and refinement (AFRODAD, 2007, 
p. 12). TAS was published by the Government of Tanzania.  Another outcome of the 
Helleiner Report was the Government’s formulation of National Poverty Eradication 
Strategy (NPES) in 1997 and Tanzania Development Vision 2025 in 1998. Both documents 
were formed via wide consultation. NPES was the national poverty eradication strategy 
ending year 2010, while Development Vision 2025 was a national economic and social vision 
to be achieved by year 2025.  At the same time, processes were under way for Tanzania to 
qualify for soft loans in IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC). In this process 
Tanzania, under the guidance of its donors – especially multilaterals, prepared the first 
Poverty Reduction Paper. Then, towards the end of PRSP preparation, CSOs were involved.   
 PRSP Ӏ is said to have incorporated major components of Development Vision 2025 (1998), 
National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES 1997) and the Tanzania Assistance Strategy. 
These strategies and documents became the foundation of PRSP Ӏ (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003, 
p. 276). PRSP Ӏ is criticised by some as being elitist and ignoring local initiatives (Gould & 
Ojanen, 2003, p. 52).  Apart from the PRSP, the outcomes of Helleiner Report, it seems, 
started action from both the Government and donors.  
Tanzania Assistance Strategy provided the three year framework for strengthening donor 
coordination, harmonization, partnerships, and national ownership in development process.  
At the end of TAS in 2006, Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) was published by the 
Government.  Global aid effectiveness processes were interwoven with Tanzanian ones such 
as TAS (1998/99-2002), the Monterrey Consensus on Financing and Development (2002), 
the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation (2003), the Marrakech Memorandum on 
Managing for Results (2004), and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005).  Accra 
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Agenda for Action (2008), which recognised the role of non-state actors, especially 
increased dialogue with CSOs.  Joint Assistance Strategy in Tanzania is ending in June 2011 
and a follow up strategy is considered.  
The establishment and good progress of Joint Assistance Strategy in Tanzania (JAST) has 
been a local success story of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. However JAST might 
have been more effective at raising local and international development expectations than 
delivering concrete results. Interviews with relevant stakeholders among both donors and 
the Government revealed acknowledgement of JAST’s success to bring the two camps 
together harmoniously and realising development outputs and outcomes. However, there 
are still issues not yet resolved related to the Paris Declaration and JAST in the local context.   
There is a lot of work on harmonisation occurring among donors; for instance, the recent 
agreement on division of labour.  Donors have agreed to limit their sector involvement and 
instead work through their representatives, namely DP leads and deputy leads in a 
particular sector. Likewise, Ministries and agencies have division of labour in sectors and 
thematic groups under broader MKUKUTA. In the education sector, for instance, there are 
eight MDAs representing the Government. These are:  
 Prime Minister’s Office (Leader)  
 Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (Deputy Leader) 
 Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government 
 Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children 
 Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Development 
 Ministry of Information, Culture and Sports 
 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
 Ministry of Communication, Science and Technology 
 
The Prime Minister’s Office is the leader in all education sector TWG dialogue, with MOEVT 
as the Deputy Leader.  In practice, Ministry of Education (MOEVT) as the deputy lead, is 
doing most of planning and dialogue in the education sector Technical Working Group.  
Education Sector Development Committee (Cluster Working Group) is composed of 
Directors from the Ministry of Education (MOEVT) and occasionally a Permanent Secretary 
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at high level meetings. Under this committee, there are four technical working groups 
(TWGs) with membership from MOEVT, donors, and CSOs. These TWGs are for Quality, 
Budget, Cross-cutting issues, and Monitoring and Evaluation.  TWGs meet four times  per 
year on policy and planning related activities, but monthly on implementation activities 
which involve Lead or Deputy Lead DPs and, if invited, CSOs and/or private sector. At one 
time these monthly meetings were held on the last Thursday of the month, but later things 
changed. The meetings were no longer held regularly and not all stakeholders participated, 
but mainly MOEVT or MDAs representatives and donors.  While the Government’s 
representation is assuredly permanent for now, donors’ division of labour in the dialogue 
structure – with the exception of the World Bank – is changing almost every two years.  This 
may be due to different resource commitments donors make in the long term. Also, it is part 
of the harmonisation agreement that DPs lead will stay on for three years.  Donors that 
were in the dialogue structure in 2010 included UK-British Council (Lead), Canada-CIDA 
(Deputy Lead), and Sweden-SIDA (Outgoing Lead). Active DPs included the World Bank 
(permanent member), UNESCO (active), and UNICEF (active). There are also delegating 
members: African Development Bank-AfDB (delegating), European Union-EU (delegating), 
France (delegating), Japan (delegating), US-MCC (delegating), and WFP (delegating). A group 
of Poverty Reduction through Budget Support (PRBS) DPs work on a troika plus model on 
top of their roles in DPG. In the education sector, the troika is represented by DFID, SIDA, 
and CIDA. Active members are the World Bank, UNICEF, and UNESCO. France, Switzerland, 
and ILO are less active.  
Despite the establishment of these dialogue structures the enthusiasm they initially 
generated towards harmonisation and aid effectiveness is gradually declining. Although still 
there is some optimism: As one DP commented, “the momentum once seen has probably 
changed a bit now” (KII, DP2). 
Improved aid structure processes and realignment raised both donors and the government 
expectations to deliver. Non-State actors were sceptical in the beginning but later joined in 
the dialogue and increased expectations too.  Improved aid delivery and its subsequent 
processes called for tangible outputs and outcomes.  CSOs feel it will be hard to convince 
people that something good can come out of this.  Research participants identified and 
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commented on expectations, success stories, and issues related to how changing aid 
modality impacted them in terms of the principles of The Paris Declaration. 
Ownership 
The Helleiner Report in 1995 noted a lack of ownership on the part of the Government of 
Tanzania.  Also, the government was tired of pursuing donor-driven policies and projects 
(Helleiner, et al., 1995).  The Paris Declaration calls for country ownership via Government 
leadership, especially in dialogue and practice, across a range of actors such as the 
Government and non-state actors. In the wake of the Paris Declaration, efforts by both 
donors and the Government increased the sense of ownership by the national government.  
According to interviews, the third phase Government in Tanzania (1995-2005) 
demonstrated considerable leadership and ownership especially by preparing the national 
development vision and subsequent strategy as advised by the Helleiner Report (KII, DP 2).  
The Government’s early efforts exercised leadership and to some degree shared “country 
ownership” with other actors especially in consultation about establishing key national 
development strategies.  There is a feeling from some actors, however, such as civil society, 
of being pushed out politely in sensitive matters under the disguise of ownership (KII, CSO 1).  
This indicates confusion about the relationship and distinction between government 
leadership and country ownership. Government leadership should not be taken as country 
ownership which is broader and involves civil society and the private sector. 
Admittedly central government ownership (not country ownership) has been quite strong 
for some time. However, the trend is now shifting – as one DP said: “the government is back 
on the driving seat of the bus, but donors are demanding passengers who give confusing 
orders such as ‘go left’, ‘go right’ at the same time which confuses the driver” (KII, DP 3).  At 
the same time it was claimed that, due to long experience of donor dependency, the 
Government is using this experience to play donors to its advantage. “The Government is 
very clever and eloquent in dealing with donors – because of many years of being a donor 
darling high flier they can easily talk to any foreign agency headquarters and change things 
locally” (KII, DP3).  The Government has adopted vigorously pro-active diplomacy using 
ambassadors in donor home countries to influence matters.  This is affecting coordination 
among donors hence sometimes giving the Government an upper hand in negotiations.   
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In the spirit of exercising government leadership, the Government of Tanzania demarcated a 
particular time of the year known as a “quiet period”. In this budget preparation period no 
donor mission is allowed to interact with Government officials at Ministerial or 
Departmental level. However, this action is said to be annoying donors because of 
unavailability of public officials (KII, DP3).  
At district level, there is no non-state actors’ involvement in full council discussion basically 
because there is no legal provision. However, civil society can contribute ideas to their 
sectors of interest at district sector planning meetings before district full council meetings.  
Civil society organisations are supposed to bring their plans to the sector meetings at district 
level (KII, CSO3).  In district full council meetings civil society are just spectators like the 
general public. In these meetings it is the councillors who debate the district plans and 
budget as presented by the heads of departments. 
Ownership can be said to be partially achieved. There is a lot to work on to improve 
especially to involve non state actors and district councils. Also it is important for donors to 
avoid helping the government to lead.  
 
Harmonisation 
There has been progress towards harmonisation among donors in Tanzania with different 
DPs working together now. However, there are still some pertinent issues with regards to 
alignment and coordination issues.  Noticeably, aid dialogue in Tanzania is quite complicated 
with Development Partners Group (most donors) and PRBS donors’ intra DPs meetings. This 
is exhaustive and sometimes confusing. As it was noted “we try to align and coordinate 
between DPG and GBS groups, but it is not always possible” (KII, DP2). Some donors’ 
projects still use their individual funding procedures and systems making cooperation with 
other donors difficult and even harder for the Government. 
Donor harmonisation was expected to increase aid predictability.  However, predictability is 
still a problem. Also, there is always the threat of what will happen to the budget if one or 
two of the major donors withdraw their assistance.  For instance, as indicated by table 6.1, 
in fiscal year 2008/09 DFID contributed 25.46% and the World Bank 23.25% of the overall 
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GBS respectively. Nearly half of the funds in budget support still come from these two 
donors. This situation poses a predictability problem and a potential risk to the running the 
government if one of these two major donors were to pull out of budget support. 
 
Table 6.1 Planned contributions of GBS for fiscal year 2008/09 
GBS Partner Amount in billion Tshs Percentage of total GBS 
AfDB 110.1 12.87 
Canada - 0 
Denmark 23.9 2.79 
DFID (UK) 217.9 25.46 
EC/EU 50.9 5.89 
Finland 23.6 2.76 
World Bank 199.0 23.25 
Ireland 23.4 2.73 
Japan 25.6 3.0 
Germany 13.9 1.62 
Netherlands 47.2 5.52 
Norway 47.5 5.54 
Switzerland 6.8 0.79 
Sweden 66.7 7.79 
Total 856.0 100 
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania (2008) 
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Alignment 
Progress towards the alignment principle of the Paris Declaration in Tanzania is mixed. 
Donors were expected to align their financial systems and procedures to the recipient 
country’s systems.  In light of Poverty Reduction through Budget Support (PRBS), donor 
alignment has occurred to a great extent. However, in sector and basket funding (which is 
the main donor funding) progress towards alignment is slow. Interviews showed that at 
local government level, in particular, a significant number of different types of reports need 
to be prepared in accordance to donor specifications. Table 6.2 shows the distribution of 
amounts of funds coming to local government authorities from various sources. Arusha 
Municipal Council had large proportion of own contribution at 17.3% of the total LGA 
budget compared to Kongwa at 1.25%.  Due to its population size and businesses that pay 
service levies, there are comparatively more sources of revenue in Arusha urban than in 
Kongwa which has a smaller population and farming based economy.  Central government 
contribution is about the same in the two LGAs with 59.7% in Arusha and 61.36% in Kongwa. 
Most of the central government contribution is used to pay salaries (personnel 
emoluments) – for instance, in Kongwa over 53% is salaries.  Donors contribute 22.7% in 
Arusha and 21.9% in Kongwa. Nearly 20 donors are making contributions to the two 
councils: LGAs are then required to submit reports to each donor, many of which have 
different reporting procedures.  Some of these projects combine donor reporting 
procedures with government systems which make things even more difficult (KII, LGA8).  
Also, LGAs have to account for the own contribution.  
Community contributions are proportionally much higher in Kongwa (15.49%) than in 
Arusha (0.2%). In both cases, community contributions have declined sharply over the last 
five years (2005-2010). Interviews revealed that communities are now more aware of their 
rights so voluntary contribution is hard to enforce (KII, LGA 6). 
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Table 6.2 LGAs sources of revenue 
LGA Own 
source % 
Central 
Government % 
DPs % Community 
Contribution % 
Total % 
Arusha (AMC) 17.3 59.7 22.7 0.2 100 
Kongwa 1.25 61.36 21.9 15.49 100 
Source: Field Work Arusha and Kongwa (2010). 
There is substantial improvement in using the government financial management systems 
and procedures. GBS funding uses the government financial procedures and systems 
however not all of the project and basket funding are using national procedures. GBS 
comprised about 38% of all assistance in fiscal year 2009/10, while project support 
accounted for 18% and basket funding 44%.  There are still alignment issues to be resolved. 
The Government of Tanzania is advocating the use of GBS to enhance predictability and 
reduce transaction costs. The trend shows that project support and basket funding have not 
declined the past five years. This shows that of the Paris Declaration principles, alignment is 
way behind at local level. Interviews revealed that there are two main reasons for this: first, 
alignment is something that depends on the quality of country ownership and 
harmonisation. Second, most donors still do not trust the local systems in place (KII, DP 1). 
This might have increased transaction costs in reality instead of cutting them down.   
 
Managing for Results 
The Government and donors have made great efforts towards managing for results in 
Tanzania.  Budget support places more emphasis on outcomes and results. PRBS donors had 
easy ways of monitoring results via national development strategy or sector development 
strategy, for example, PEDP.  While this serves the long-term purpose of the Government to 
manage for results, on the other hand it complicates matters for implementing staff who 
are supposed to report outputs and results to donors and government stakeholders. This is 
especially complicated where there is a lack of cohesion at Ministerial level.  Budget support 
has introduced close to 100 specialists from the 14 donors into the Government 
Departments to monitor and manage over 100 indicators. “It is like the government has 
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invited strangers into the bathroom or kitchen” (KII, DP3).  This implies that putting too 
much emphasis on one principle has the potential to undermine progress in another. As 
donors try to manage results without the Government, they compromise ownership and 
government leadership. 
 
Mutual Accountability 
The Government of Tanzania and its development partners are striving to enhance mutual 
accountability and transparency.  Public Expenditure Annual and Midterm Reviews provide a 
benchmark on what sort of things need to be strengthened. Mutual accountability means 
that when things go wrong either side has evidence and a basis on which to challenge or 
agree with the other party.  Mutual accountability also allows legislators to watch over the 
Government and ensure there are checks and balances. For the first time since 
independence the Parliament in Tanzania has moved closer to transparency (KII, CSO1).  The 
legislators in the past five years have raised and deliberated very critical issues with the 
government.  
There has been changing expectations on aid effectiveness in Tanzania. Outcomes of the 
Helleiner report and the Paris Declaration principles were taken positively by the 
government and donors. This perspective raised expectations of the government, donors, 
and non state actors. However nearly ten years later improvements in building trust that 
was gained is now gradually eroding.  
 
6.5 Effects of Decentralization by Devolution 
Decentralisation policies have evolved since independence. The government of Tanzania 
after independence started decentralisation by abolishing local chiefs appointed by the 
colonial government.  The abolished local chiefs were replaced by Regions and Districts with 
staff appointed by the President or Public Service Commission. The first focus of 
decentralisation was on democratisation in which direct elections by the people was 
adopted for District Councils in 1962 (PORALG, 2005, p. 4).  The Arusha Declaration in 1967 
which instituted an African variant of socialism, ujamaa, was a major policy initiative to 
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decentralise.  Regions had substantial authority with districts as their administrative 
extensions. The village was made the centre of democracy where the Village Chairperson 
and the Village Council were elected by the people. Ujamaa emphasised Self-Reliance in 
self-administered villages.   
The local government system at district level did not deliver as expected and in 1972, it was 
abolished in favour of a centralised government system.  Line ministries (MDAs) were 
assigned with responsibility to deliver basic services, such as primary education, at the local 
level. This was known as de-concentration (PORALG, 2005, p. 5).   
The United Republic of Tanzania Constitution in 1977 reemphasised decentralisation. 
District Councils were reinstituted in 1982 by the Local Government Act which formed Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs).   The constitutional amendments of 1985 stated the central 
position of LGAs. 
The Government of Tanzania with support of DPs is implementing a number of reforms. One 
of these reforms is the Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) which fosters 
Decentralization by Devolution. Established in 1996, the Local Government Reform Agenda 
is said to be one the big steps towards decentralisation (JICA, 2008, p. 54). This agenda was 
translated into government policy documents in 1998. It was the Policy Paper on Local 
Government Reform that went further to describe the policy as Decentralisation by 
Devolution (D by D).  D by D is meant to devolve political, financial, and administrative 
powers to local authorities.  D by D gives LGAs autonomy in these three areas. 
Administratively LGAs are accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office Local Governance and 
Regional Administration (PMO-RALG).  Since 2000, D by D and LGRP have started to operate.  
In this new setting, the role of Regions was reduced to advisory and supervision. 
 D by D is the latest initiative to bring development and decision-making closer to people. D 
by D, in line with basic education sector, is meant to give communities independence over 
decisions on primary schools. This includes finances and plans.  The school management 
committee is the primary hub to make decisions and implement initiatives at school and 
village level.  
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In practice, D by D has had a positive impact on LGAs. Interviews revealed that D by D has 
improved the quality of discussion at the council level when councillors dialogue to come up 
with concrete district plans (KII, LGA 3). It also helps councillors and district staff implement 
and monitor activities from an informed perspective. D by D has increased accountability 
and to some extent transparency among beneficiaries.  Budgets and grant information are 
pasted on district notice boards, also at village and school notice boards for the public to see. 
However, there are challenges that D by D has not addressed at district level.  
Decentralisation has not devolved adequate fiscal authority to local governments. 
Interviewees at district level pointed out that most of the funds received at district level 
(nearly 90%) from the treasury are tied within budget items and their use is restricted in 
these areas. However, all the plans are discussed and compiled from villages at the district 
level. This makes bottom-up planning a problem because top-down budget guidelines don’t 
match with what was planned. “It is really hard to communicate with communities here 
when their most important planned activity does not fit in budget guidelines we have 
received from the treasury” (KII, LGA2).  
 In terms of administrative authority, D by D has given school management committees a 
mandate to prioritise and implement school activities. However, in primary schools, for 
instance, it was learned that both capitation and development grants are tied budget items 
from the top so have to be used in accordance with plans. For instance, capitation grants 
use in Arusha and Kongwa schools was found to be as outlined in table 6.3. School 
committee have no mandate to use funds outside this plan. This contradicts the fact that 
school committees – essentially an extension of communities – are supposed to be 
independent in decision-making, budgeting/expenditure, and implementation. Most of the 
11 members are community members, especially parents of children attending the 
particular school, village government representatives, and faith-based organisations. The 
planning cycle through the village government is quite inclusive. “Parents can say what they 
want for the children at school” (KII, SC3).  But this freedom is limited by rigid guidelines 
from above. According to head teachers of the schools, the system of top-down budget 
guidelines makes local involvement irrelevant, just a waste of people’s time in bottom-up 
planning processes (KII, SC1 & SC2) 
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Table 6.3 Capitation grants use 
Budget item % Allocated 
Books 40% 
Stationery-chalks, exercise books, pencils 20% 
Buildings maintenance 20% 
Internal examinations/assessments 10% 
Administration 10% 
Source: Njiro and Kongwa Primary school’s notice boards. 
 
When top-down guidelines are tied in budgets it makes actual spending at school level 
inflexible.  It was learned however that school committees sometimes decide to use these 
funds for needs that are not outlined under capitation grants budget guidelines from the 
central government. “Sometimes we save a particular amount for two school terms in order 
to spend on something our school really needs which is not in capitation grants budget 
guidelines” (KII, SC1). These savings appear in record books as repeated payments of goods. 
Another trick used by schools and school committee is to inflate numbers of children by 
enrolling “ghost” children. This helps the school to get extra capitation grants because it is 
calculated per child.  It was noted in one school “although we don’t do it here, but other 
schools illegally enrol extra names of children who are not there to increase the amount of 
capitation grants as a way of meeting school’s needs” (KII, SC1). Both primary school 
teachers called for change in the way capitation grants are managed. “The need should 
come first and not numbers of children, if you have few children you are at a disadvantage” 
(KII, SC1). This is just one example of how centralised budgetary guidelines overshadow local 
initiatives and bottom-up planning.  Although there is a significant improvement in 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation on paper, in practice very little is done at local 
level.   
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Understandably, when fiscal decentralisation is fully adopted the local government is 
expected to have its own revenue sources. However, there are quite few sources from 
which local governments can collect revenue. These sources are in five groups; first is 
various types of levy (hotel, crops, markets, auctions, billboards, services, and bus stops).  
The second group is taxes such as property tax for all buildings in a given township. The 
third category is liquor licenses. The fourth group is various types of fees such as livestock 
slaughter, running public halls, fines due to breaches of local by-laws, agencies income, and 
tender income. Fifth, income from district council property such as house rents, kiosks 
shops levy, meat shops levy, buildings plan levy, forest products levy, and land rent.  Added 
to these are grants from the central government, known as general purpose grants. The 
central government pays compensation of income lost due to the scrapping of some local 
government revenue sources such as the development levy.  
The rest of the revenues are collected by the central government agency, Tanzania Revenue 
Authority. “It is very difficult to meet financial needs at the council level, for any institution 
to be strong and independent it needs to have its own reliable source of revenues” (KII, 
LGA9).  “Failure to implement some budgeted items because of limited own resource base is 
definite” (KII, LGA8). The central government grants make up nearly 60% of the local 
government resources (table 6.2), while donors projects accounts for nearly 20%. Most of 
the government’s grants pay salaries (58%). The local government working in this way has 
little or no control over finances hence many projects remain unfinished budget year after 
budget year.  
Decentralised administration is still quite difficult. Although councils make their own 
decisions under councillors and council management teams, there is still strong allegiance to 
the central government and/or political parties’ organs. Research participants felt that the 
local government structure makes working relationship quite difficult (KII, LGA7). At district 
level there is a District Commissioner and District Administrative Secretary appointed by the 
President. These are supposed to represent the central government at local meetings. These 
posts were viewed as political positions designed to control the local (KII, LGA13).  Although 
these people are not voting members of the district full council meetings, their presence has 
an impact on local initiatives.  The District Executive Director, too, is the employee of the 
central government under Prime Ministers’ Office Regional Administration and Local 
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Government (PMO-RALG). The central role of the Director is the secretary of the council and 
runing day-to-day supervision of technical staff at district level employed by the local 
government. “This is like the central government is working here at local level” (KII, LGA15). 
 
6.6 Transparency and accountability 
At school level the contribution of aid for transparency is relatively big. Prior to Primary 
Education Development Plan Ӏ (PEDP Ӏ), which was heavily funded by the World Bank and 
other donors, the school was under the management of the communities. However, due to 
the fact that parents paid fees to complement government resources, consultative dialogue 
at this level was significant.  The abolition of compulsory primary school fees and the 
introduction of capitation grants called for greater transparency and dialogue among 
community members and the school administration.  It was at this time also that civil 
society working in education sector trained school management committees.   
School committees are supposed to meet quarterly. Ad hoc meetings are usually called if 
there is an emergency, an urgent matter concerning children, or anything for which external 
assistance was mentioned “whenever someone wants to help the school we call for a 
meeting” (KII, SC2).  The role of the school committee is to manage school human and 
financial resources as well as to ensure children acquire necessary skills.  
Village leaders’ representatives in the school committee provide a link to incorporate school 
priorities into village plans. Also the head teacher is a member of village development 
committee. The Ward Education Coordinator is a member of the Ward Development 
Committee. In this way it is assumed that individual school issues will be raised in Ward to 
District Council priorities.  
A school’s daily financial spending requires two signatories; the head teacher and the school 
committee treasury.  At least two of the school committee members have to physically go 
with the head teacher to get quotations and purchase.  This enforces transparency and 
better use of resources at school level. However, sometimes misuse of funds and corrupt 
activities still occur. One teacher said “these funds (capitation grants) tempt head teachers 
into corruption and misuse of public funds” (KII, SC2).   
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School management committee and teachers are more careful with parents’ donations.  At 
Kongwa Primary school parents donate Tshs 300/- per pupil per year. These contributions 
go towards end of term examination preparations, especially to buy papers because 
capitation grants are insufficient and in most cases delayed. Parents have a lot of questions 
in this area which makes the school committee accountable because of these donations. 
Parents have little concern really about capitation grants as confirmed by an assistant head 
teacher “no one says or follow up but they ask about things for instance why now our 
children do not get exercise books” (KII, SC3). It is not easy to respond to parents’ questions 
because if the government removed fees to allow all children to come to school why go 
back to parents asking for more donations?  Teachers and the school committees feel the 
decision to abolish school fees at primary school for every child was a political decision.  
Parents should contribute towards their children’s education in order to make quality 
education accessible (KII, SC2). 
Photo 6.1 Village Notice Board to enhance accountability and transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Field Research (2010) 
 
Despite all the challenges of transparency there has been a significant progress. Most 
villages have established and encouraged the use of notice boards. District and village 
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notices are posted on notice boards for villagers to read (Photo 6.1). The notice boards were 
designed to curb lack of financial transparency at district and village level. These notices are 
posted on quarterly basis once grants are issued. 
In both district and villages, Local Government Development Grant (LGDG) financial notices 
are posted indicating per capita amounts of funds received by the local government and 
sector distribution. Project support funds from donors are not posted on notice board. 
Photo 6.2 Public Letter from District Executive Director showing April 2010 grants 
 
Source Field Research (2010) 
For instance, in Kongwa (Photo 6.2) a letter from the District Executive Director shows 
sector distribution of funds for the April 2010 quarter.  Administration was allocated 22.6%, 
works/building (12%), education (38%), health (14.6%), water (10%), and agriculture (2%).  
However, these figures do not show enough detail for an average person to follow up. For 
example, the letter shows the education sector was funded relatively higher than other 
sectors but in reality there are two departments, secondary and primary education.  Also, 
the education department has no project involved which means all their funding comes 
from the central government grants.  It is, therefore, easier to track issues of accountability 
within education sector than other sectors that receive project funding which are not 
posted on the notice board. Both transparency and accountability are limited at this level. 
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Financial reports posted on district council notice boards or school notice boards are 
important for transparent and accountability. However, it was learned that not many people 
bother to read or ask questions about these financial figures on notice boards. Many people 
ask questions related to the problems such as missing school stationery. Conversely, CSOs’ 
engagement with the media is perceived to have had a tremendous impact on community 
members: “It makes sense when people hear from the radio or TV or read from the  
newspaper that funds provided would have bought however many exercise books or build 
however many classrooms” (KII, CSO5). 
 
6.7 Declining participation in community contributions 
There is increased declining community voluntary participation in school and other 
development activities. For example, in classrooms construction using development grants 
communities have to mobilise their own resources and construct up to linter level and then 
ask for the government to complete the work. There are major reasons for dwindling 
community contribution in kind and cash. First, it was said some politicians confuse people. 
For instance in Kongwa District, the school committee planned to build two extra 
classrooms to curb the problem of overcrowding in classroom (70 children per classroom).  
They agreed to ask village leaders (some of them members of the committee) to 
communicate this to community members. However, community members refused their 
labour contribution. It was learnt later that, when asked by community members, the ward 
councillor said they should not contribute because the government gives all the funds for 
that purpose (KII, SC2).  The second reason is the complex planning cycle.  Primary school’s 
priorities are compiled by the school committee and sent to the village assembly. The plans 
are then compiled by the village development committee. This committee forwards these 
priorities to the ward development committee which compiles and prioritises plans from 
three to four villages. At this point some of the priorities will be dropped or changed to suit 
the next level. Ward Development Committee (WDC) planning meetings have 
representatives from villages, also Ward Executive Officer and ward sector specialists such 
as Ward Education Coordinator. Some district planning specialists participate at ward level 
development meetings. Plans and priorities are consolidated at the ward level according to 
budget ceiling and the summary is sent to the District Council.  District Council’s sector 
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committees prioritise again all the plans from the wards (10-14 wards) in accordance with 
sector and cross-cutting policy issues. The district finance and planning committee compiles 
the report for discussion at the District Full Council meeting.  Ward Councillors and a 
Member of Parliament debate issues at this level where the district management team 
including sector heads of departments and District Executive Director provide technical 
expertise.  After agreement and compromise, the district annual plan and budget is 
approved by two signatures of the District Council Chairperson or Mayor representing the 
legislature and the District Executive Director or Municipal Director representing the 
executive.  The district annual plan and budget is at this stage forwarded to the Regional 
Advisory committee which include membership from all districts of the region (about four to 
five districts). The district plan is then returned to the district for amendments or 
corrections. A complete district annual plan is now presented directly to the Treasury or 
Ministry of Finance.  The Treasury gives feedback to the District Council usually at a meeting 
with all Districts councils. After working on the amendments, the district annual plan and 
budget is now complete and presented to the Treasury. The Treasury compiles all the 
district plans and sector ministry plans into one which is tabled at the Parliament for 
approval. This is a very complex process in which some very burning issues prioritised at a 
particular school get diluted. For this reason, community-level motivation to participate is 
eroded.  
The third reason leading to declining community participation is linked to limited 
accountability mechanisms.  “When people contribute in cash or in kind at school or village 
level they expect feedback on progress but when no any report is heard and rumours start 
to go around it sends a wrong message” (KII, LGA4). At this point community members react 
differently and the most polite one is said to be refusing to contribute. For example, a 
school in Kongwa asked every parent to contribute 1ream of paper which costs about 5,000 
Tshs. When parents asked how they used all the reams from 500 pupils in that year there 
was no proper answer, so they did not want to contribute any longer (KII, LGA4). This is a 
typical example of parents being willing to support their children’s education but, faced with 
the challenges of limited transparency and accountability, parents opt for resistance.  
The fourth reason was attributed to aid agencies especially civil society. It was learned that 
some NGOs’ practice of paying participants allowances to participate in their (NGO) events 
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contributed to declining voluntary community contributions. It was noted that both in 
Kongwa and Arusha it was very difficult for local government officials to get village or street 
leaders come to an event if they were not paid allowances to do so.  “When we go and call 
them for meetings they demand allowances otherwise they do not cooperate” (KII, LGA15).  
Some NGOs however denied paying allowances because they depend on donor funds that 
don’t have that provision. Their fingers were pointed to the government’s organs perpetual 
behaviour of paying people to participate in events (KII, CSO 3). This perspective, which is 
also shared by donors, proves that community members and leaders are aware of what is 
going on. 
Five, politicising development through multiparty politics is contributing to declining 
community voluntary participation in development projects. For instance, during election 
campaigns, the incumbent party is known for going around showcasing what they have 
done including building community projects such as schools. This makes things hard 
afterwards because community members feel that the school was built by people of all 
ideologies. The outcome of this is non-cooperation from most community members in 
labour or cash contribution in school or development projects. 
The final reason is the confusion brought by the newly embraced Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) policy.  Most of the services once delivered by the councils are now outsourced to 
private contractors, usually not from the villages.  In the past, schools were built entirely by 
community contributions of labour and materials. Now when a school is constructing a 
classroom it has become hard to convince parents to contribute money or labour because of 
their experience with PPP. “Parents know that contractors are paid by the council or the 
government, so why help them for free?” (KII, LGA14). The study suggests this trend is 
worse in urban areas such as Arusha Municipal compared to rural-based districts such as 
Kongwa. 
 
6.8 Effectiveness of aid modality 
Research participants were asked about which of the aid modalities they regard as most 
effective, budget support or project support. The responses varied at different levels, 
national and district.  Government officials at national level – both Ministry of Finance and 
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Economic Affairs and Ministry of Education and Vocational Training – preferred budget 
support in the long-term. However, they did not play down project support either. 
Surprisingly, they pointed out that budget support and project support each have both 
benefits and challenges.  Budget support is said to be good because of inclusive 
development in terms of financing. In this way, all districts will be supported according to 
needs and population size. Budget support is very effective at macro level. For example, one 
respondent pointed out that budget support reduces inflation and prepares the 
Government to tackle development initiatives broadly and long-term. The constraint of 
budget support is that it is less effective at micro level because of the little benefits thinly 
distributed in a large area (KII, MoFEA). 
Project support is seen to be very effective at micro level in terms of targeting a sector and 
end-user of services.  Project aid has a tendency to reduce bureaucracy accordingly (KII, 
MoFEA).  However, project aid has the potential to increase inflation because of funds that 
flow outside the treasury. For instance, in the 2009/10 fiscal year nearly 60% of aid by-
passed the Government system through projects. Efforts have been made by current aid 
dialogue to ensure all project funds are captured by the Treasury. However, the Treasury is 
unable to control disbursement and reporting.  
At district council level, legislators – including Members of Parliament and Ward Councillors 
interviewed – had a positive view of budget support. Budget support was said to have 
advantages over projects at district level because it is territorial. Budget support covers a 
large geographical area using inclusive criteria laid out in the national budget (KII, LGA 16).  
For planning and finance staff at district level, budget support reduces workloads and 
improves disbursement and expenditure at local level (LGA, 8).   
However, some sector departments at district level thought budget support is not good 
because it involves cumbersome procurement procedures that encourage corruption and 
implementation delays. Budget support is linked to delayed disbursement and funding 
insufficiencies. On the other hand, if the district was lucky enough to get a project, decisions 
about finances were quick. It was revealed that with projects it was easier to evaluate 
progress and learn about the project issues at local level (KII, LGA 12 & 13). 
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 The disadvantages of projects were mentioned. First, project support has a tendency to 
leave out some parts of the country. An example: the World Bank road fund project covered 
only 20 districts in the whole country out of 133 districts in 2010. The criteria to choose a 
district are sometimes obscure. “Some ministers used projects to concentrate resources in 
their constituents using project support; they cannot do that with budget support” (KII, 
LGA16). Second, project support donors sometimes come with their own technical staff 
which complicates working at district council.  In Arusha, for instance, Municipal Council is 
supported by one donor agency to build capacity for local revenue collection and financial 
management. Two advisors are working with the municipality at the District Revenue 
Department. However, some municipal staff thought that technical advisors did not have 
the knowledge to build anyone’s capacity because of differences between Tanzania’s 
financial system and that of their home country (KII, LGA10). 
 
6.9 Local government decision-making critical issues 
Local governance at district level has benefits of consultative decision-making and 
implementation of initiatives. There are issues that face both politicians and technical 
experts. Interviews revealed that politicians and district practitioners sometimes have 
different views on what constitutes the best approach to development initiatives. The most 
outspoken differences are on quantity versus quality. In most cases politicians want greater 
numbers of things such as classrooms and desks, among others, with little regard to quality. 
“Unfortunately our politicians are too ambitious. They want big quantities of visible 
structures such as classrooms with little consideration of essential components of education; 
for instance, enough qualified teachers” (KII, LGA6).  However interviews with councillors 
revealed that there is always tension between them and district technical staff. “We make 
decisions and technical personnel implement them, so if quality is not observed who is to be 
blame? We do not want children to miss education so we want to make use of every 
opportunity” (KII, LGA18). 
 
6.10 Exit strategy? 
Joint assistance strategy has an exit strategy. However, there is no indication of 
implementing exit strategy at least in the near future. The DPG aid structure, donor’s 
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division of labour, and a comprehensive JAST dialogue structure seem to have established a 
permanent arrangement between actors.  Slow and poor performance in some MKUKUTA 
indicators plus suspicion of corruption locks actors in some form of permanent dialogue. 
However, the PRBS donors group seems to have lost momentum just as other donors have 
done. As a result, until now (2010) PRBS has not attracted new members since 2004 when 
membership reached 11, rising from five in 2000.  Current challenges in aid structure could 
possibly be discouraging more donors to join the budget support group.  
While partners in aid dialogue in Tanzania have been discussing exit strategy – at least in 
report such as JAST (2006) – in practice, apart from efforts to put systems in place, not much 
is has been done. However, this year the Government has started to reduce volumes of aid 
received. In 2010/11 fiscal year, the Government has reduced the aid proportion of the 
budget from nearly 40% to 25%. The Government has raised its budget income locally 
through taxation to cover the gap left by reduced aid. Taxation is not enough to fill the aid 
reduction gap so the Government has accessed substantial resources through domestic and 
international borrowing. Concerns have been raised that this will attract high inflation (KII, 
MoFEA). 
 
6.11 Conclusion 
Policy-making and implementation in aid influenced environments involves many processes 
and stakeholders. Multiple processes in aid dialogue structure in Tanzania are both 
rewarding and confusing. In changing aid modality the Government has gained strength 
favoured by the policy-making processes. Correspondingly, Civil Society Organisations and 
local governments are increasingly sidelined. Non-state actors are slowly withdrawing from 
dialogue and instead invest more time and energy in public engagement. Likewise, local 
governments are being centralised in practice, with strong financial guidelines and 
monitoring from above coupled with limited local resource bases. There is fatigue on the 
part of the donors. Community voluntary participation is quickly fading away. Overall, good 
processes and subsequent policies have not translated into appropriate effective 
implementation. The lack of coherence lies between and within actors involved in policy-
making processes and implementation.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
This chapter concludes with key findings of the research. This study aimed to address the 
research gap between foreign aid influence in policy-making and implementation in practice 
in the primary education sector at the district level in Tanzania particularly on the extent the 
Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness works at national and district level. The study 
focussed on two different districts in Tanzania, using school committees as a case study. It 
was important to find out how foreign aid-influenced decision-making processes are linked 
to a traditionally strong local planning culture.  This chapter presents some comments as a 
response to the research questions of this study and conclusions.  
The main research question was “To what extent does foreign aid influence local decision-
making at national and district levels?” 
The study sub-questions were: 
 
1. How do aid instruments influence decisions in the implementation of national and 
district development priorities? 
2. To what extent do district level decision-making processes in priority sectors include 
local development plans and priorities? 
3. What is the response of different district-level development stakeholders in planning 
and implementing aid-assisted development priorities? 
 
Research findings and subsequent discussions were grouped in two major categories: actors 
in policy-making and implementation and processes and/or outcomes. 
How do aid instruments influence decisions in the implementation of national and district 
development priorities? 
 
The objective of this question was to determine the extent to which aid instruments help to 
shape national and district-level priorities and resource allocation. Actors at this level 
included donors under a loosely organised Development Partners Group (DPG); central 
government representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and other 
ministries, departments, and agencies; Local Government Authorities (LGAs); and civil 
society. 
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The new aid modality has opened dialogue between donors and recipient country officials.  
This study has revealed that initially dialogue between donors and most domestic actors 
was strong. In this sense foreign aid has had a major influence in opening spaces of dialogue, 
especially to include perspectives of civil society, alternative to the central government 
decision-making processes. The influence of foreign aid in creating space for dialogue and 
engagement is significant. The current aid structure includes the position of civil society in 
policy discussions especially with regards to budget support and Medium Expenditure 
Frameworks (MTEFs).  The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles can be observed 
through this local aid and policy-making architecture.  In the beginning, major decisions 
made especially on basic education had inputs from donors, the government, and civil 
society. A good example is the implementation of the first Primary Education Development 
Plan (PEDP Ӏ) which was implemented for five years (2002-2006) and involved all key 
stakeholders at national level in technical working groups.  Achievements were obvious, in 
that most school age children were enrolled by 2005. However, other objectives of the plan 
were not achieved, such as improving the quality of education and improving management 
capacity within the education system. 
More recently however, the changed aid environment has had significant influence in 
changing relationships.  The new aid modality has strengthened the central government at 
the expense of other domestic actors such as civil society and local government.  This is 
contrary to one of the pillars of Paris Declaration; namely country ownership.  Country 
ownership meant government leadership but with involvement of other state and non-state 
actors in policy-making and implementation. In the current Tanzania set up, country 
ownership means central government ownership.  Civil society faces major obstacles to 
participate effectively in policy engagement; there are delayed invitations, CSOs do not get 
documents prior to meetings, and the government does not necessarily take their inputs on 
board.  Donors face a similar challenge in terms of delayed invitation – although not of a 
similar extent – but they have learned to participate regardless of circumstances. Although 
donors have significant influence, it was learned that stronger central government is taking 
advantage of the not so active development partners in policy meetings and 
implementation. However, on the other hand, donors have not managed to coordinate their 
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activities and work as one which has confused the government in the driving seat which 
hears several different donor voices. This confusion has limited aid effectiveness. 
Processes and or outcomes 
The outcomes of policy dialogue are varied.  There are positive outcomes especially when 
policy documents are produced with inputs from diverse stakeholders.  Recent 
developments however show negative outcomes such as civil society’s gradual 
disengagement from policy dialogues at national level due to fatigue and tokenism.  
A process issue is the dialogue space at district level whereby civil society organisations are 
not welcome at full council meetings. However, their inputs are welcome at district 
departmental level. Limiting civil society participation at district full council meetings makes 
decisions and implementation rather one-sided and hence compromises a multi-stakeholder 
structure at national-level. 
Overall, there is a lack of cohesion between policy-making and implementation.  In some 
cases very good policies are made but there is limited implementation. This is due to less or 
no participation of important stakeholders in priority setting and decision-making cycles. 
The question of ownership is obvious here: implementers do not feel they own these 
policies. 
 
To what extent do district level decision-making processes in priority sectors include local 
development plans and priorities? 
The new aid modality increases centralisation of decision-making and policy-
implementation. Dependence on resources from central Government has weakened local 
governments. Budget ceilings, as directed by the funding frameworks of the Ministry of 
Finance or Treasury, are used to cut down on community priorities regardless of order 
hence putting local governments in a position where they are not trusted. In other words, 
bottom-up plans and priorities meet with the top-down frameworks at district level where 
the top-down approach wins because of the power of resources. This has made the running 
of schools difficult because schools receive limited resources in the new aid modality. At the 
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same time, plans and priorities made by school committees are often compromised or 
watered-down at national and district levels.  
 
What is the response of different district-level development stakeholders in planning and 
implementing aid-assisted development priorities? 
 
This study has found varied responses to aid influenced policy-making at different levels. At 
national level the central government has become strong and leads discussions. However, 
donors still play a significant role. The response of the central government has been mixed. 
First, there is compliance to obvious things like improving fiscal management structures but 
these seem to be to conform to donor requirements rather than embracing the culture of 
accountability.  Second, there have been modifications of agreed plans to suit local contexts 
or to safeguard political interests.  Finally, there has been some sense of agency in dealing 
with some policy issues. The central government resisted the involvement of other 
stakeholders in some decisions made. 
At district level two main responses came out strongly: 1) compliance and 2) manoeuvre of 
centrally-made policies and priorities. District councils have complied with financial 
guidelines, budget ceilings’ and top-down priorities that ignore or even contradict district-
made plans and priorities.  District councils have also responded by redirecting funds into 
their core priorities by modifying payments schedules or even renaming implementation 
strategies to meet local needs. 
At school committee or community level the responses have been compliance, redirecting, 
and resistance.  In issues that are generally agreed upon – for instance accountability and 
transparency in the use of capitation grants – there has been compliance. Paradoxically, 
there was also evidence of a well-known practice of redirecting school resources to fit into 
needs that are not addressed in Ministry of Education guidance on the use of capitation 
grants.  In other ways communities have openly resisted participating in some projects 
when they felt their priorities were not being addressed. This has caused delays in executing 
some education-related development projects which need substantial community 
contribution.  
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The Main Research Question 
The main research question of this thesis was “To what extent does foreign aid influence 
local decision-making at national and district levels?” 
The policy-making environment in Tanzania is greatly influenced by aid-related discussions 
at the national level. This research has found that donors and the central government 
institutions are heavily involved. Civil society organisations were involved in the education 
sector in the beginning to some extent but gradually civil society involvement declined. It 
can be concluded that at the national level policy-making processes in the aid environment 
have been captured by the central government. The central government has more control 
on the national development strategy today than at the beginning of the new aid modality, 
being more open to inputs from non state actors during the early change to the new aid 
modality than currently. 
At the same time district government and civil society are left out of policy-making and, 
consequently, district governments face limited resources and top-down guidelines. This is 
not necessarily because of donors’ influence but it may be regarded as an unexpected 
outcome of the aid dialogue structure.  
District level policy-making and implementation processes do not effectively involve civil 
society organisations and other non state actors. This may have negative implications 
especially in policy coherence between the national and district implementers. Again, weak 
linkages between national and district actors is not necessarily a direct result of donor or aid 
influence but is more likely to be an outcome of the assumptions made by the global aid 
structure that consultative development policy-making would work smoothly at the district 
level. 
While this study shows clearly that there has been more central government-driven policy-
making processes, some involvement of non state actors and full participation of donors the 
new aid modality has weakened district-level policy-making and implementation.  More 
work needs to be done to include non state actors effectively, strengthen district-level 
policy-making and implementation and involve non state actors at district-level.  
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Appendix 3 Interview Schedule 
Interview Schedule (checklist) 
 
This is just a research guide, not all questions will be asked to individual participants however other 
follow up questions that are not written here will be asked depending on the participant’s response. 
 
The extent aid instruments influence district-level priorities and resource allocation 
 
1. What sectors at district level receive foreign aid to facilitate development? 
2. What forms of aid are you aware of in those sectors? 
3. What is the proportion of aid to resources raised within the district? 
4. What is the proportion of aid to resources sent from the central government? 
5. How does the district team set development priorities to be implemented? 
6. How easy it is for the district council to localize aid instruments-bound development 
priorities? 
 
Decision-making processes on the inclusion of local development plans/ priorities 
 
7. How many times do district council meet to decide on development priorities? 
8. What is the role of the following stakeholders in preparing district development priorities? 
 central government 
 targeted communities 
 district management team 
 district council 
 elected officials (Member of Parliament and councillors) 
9. In your opinion at what level is the final decision about district development priorities made? 
10. How do different stakeholders at district level reach consensus on development priorities 
set? 
11. What improvements if any do you think the current development planning and 
implementation can be made?  
 
The response (resistance, compliance and manoeuvre) of different players at the district council 
on development priorities 
 
12. How do district council stakeholders respond to suggestions of development initiatives from 
outside? Why or why not? 
13. How do you manage disagreements between parties involved in planning and 
implementation? 
14. In your opinion who in the district council has the most power to decide on development 
priorities with regards to foreign aid through budget support? 
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15. Please explain decision-making power accrued by the following members of the district 
council 
 District Executive Director 
 District management team 
 Member of Parliament 
 Councillors 
 Representatives of Non-governmental Organizations 
16. Can you recall the period when the district council resisted development plans from outside 
the council? 
 Central government 
 Aid agency 
17. Why did the council resist or respond differently? 
18. How has the district council been able to balance between the need for resources such as 
funds and implementing local needs-driven priorities? 
19. Do you think creativity to solve local problems is being used at the district level? Why and 
why not? 
20. How does the district council balance power between stakeholders? 
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Appendix 4 Quiet Period Letter 
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